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The Essays on the Law of Nature of Locke first appeared in public
in 1954, thanks to the relentless effort of Wolfgang von Leyden. Before
that date, Lockean scholars had made few studies of Locke’s natural law
theory. Most of their studies were focussed of Locke’s theory of Politics
and Epistemology. The scanty inquiry into his concept of the natural law
was, perhaps, due to the scarcity of direct and valuable sources, or maybe,
modern thinkers were yet absorbed by the innovation of Locke’s em-
piricim. However, after the first publication of the Essays, just about fifty
years ago, the interest in the topic has increased remarkably.
As a consequence of the first publication of the Essay concerning
Human Understanding and the Two Treatises on Government in 1890,
many contemporaries of Locke in Oxford had already questioned his con-
cept of the natural law. A clear proof this are the letters of Tyrell to Locke
in which he mentions the critiques of the clerical conservatives, and much
later, the accusations of the Sceptics and Epicureans1. Since then, there had
been a constant clamour from his friends, insisting that he publish his «lec-
tures on the law of nature» in order to clarify his position and to give end
to the growing controversy. Locke seemed to ignore them. He died without
publishing.
The failure to publish the «Lectures», the long silence, and the appar-
ent inattention to his friends’ insistence became a big question. What could
have been the reasons behind this failure? Definitely, it was hard to give any
supposition, not unless the work itself –the Essays– would have been submit-
ted to a thorough and direct scrutiny. This was made possible in 1954. From
then on, his theory of natural law has been the object of new investigations.
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1. See the letters of James Tyrell to John Locke, dated 30 June 1690 and 27 July
1690 in Mark GOLDIE, John Locke Selected Correspondence (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 147-149.
It is the primary object of this present work to look into the original
conception of Locke on the natural law and to find its relevance in the con-
temporary times. The title of this thesis –John Locke and the Natural Law,
Yesterday and Today: A Critical Analysis– describes best the main objec-
tive and the method employed in this work. At first sight, it gives the im-
pression of a historical study, but in reality, what I intend to present here is
a critical study of Locke’s concept of the natural law. The two adverbial el-
ements, Yesterday and Today, refer to the diverse understanding of his nat-
ural law theory in his major works and the interpretations that posterior
Lockean scholars have made.
I intend to present, as much as possible, a clear, direct, and exten-
sive exposition of the doctrine of Locke on the natural law, which he de-
veloped not only in the Essays but also in some parts of his major works,
like the Essay and the Two Treatises. After which, I will try to point out
the positive aspects of his natural law theory and to expose some of the
vacillations, or weak points that may have caused some problems with re-
spect to the integrity and consistency of his moral doctrines. Finally, I
will offer a critical analysis of the whole exposition, taking into account
not only my own understanding of the topic, but also some observations
of other recent commentators. It is good to note, first, the continuity or
discontinuity of his thoughts between the earliest Essays and the later ma-
ture works; and secondly, the different views, reactions, and relevance of
Locke’s concept of the natural law after the first publication of the Es-
says.
How important was the natural law theory in the entire moral pro-
gram of Locke? Von Leyden admits that, «Locke’s doctrine of natural law.
was never in detail reconsidered by him in his later writings, though it be-
came an important premise of several of his mature theories»2. I admit the
supposition of von Leyden that the doctrines of Locke on the natural law
most likely connect his Epistemology with his tenets in the Moral Philoso-
phy. It also appears convincing that his theory of the natural law stands out
as an essential source in order to understand the entire Lockean moral pro-
gram. We can only have a complete affirmation of this supposition after a
thorough exposition of his natural law theory.
If the natural law theory was the spinal cord of his entire moral pro-
gram, it only proves that he considered it with high regard. We pose now
the question as to whether the primary importance that he gave it then will
have the same acceptance nowadays. Will the natural law theory that he
conceived then have the same significance and relevance in the moral and
political situations today?
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2. W. von LEYDEN, «Introduction», in John LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 82. Hereafter referred to as ELN.
We affirm that Locke’s theory of natural law has never lost its val-
ue; indeed, it seems more indispensable and urgent in the recent intellectu-
al and cultural progress. There is an obvious need of returning and insist-
ing on the fundamental ground of morality, particularly in facing this
multifaceted and novel idea of human rights, freedom, social and econom-
ic progress, and the newly conceptualised forms of human relationship.
The lack of fundamental concepts of morality, and more concretely, the
negligence of the natural law can lead inevitably to a kind of social mala-
dy. It is neither the collective agreement of the different leaders of the soci-
ety, nor the formulation of any international law that can guarantee the full
respect for human dignity and the preservation of peace, especially if such
agreements and laws are against the fundamental natural law, or were de-
fective.
The ignorance of the natural law brings indifferent cultural and
ethical valuation which moral standars in jeopardy. The absence of an in-
ternal and absolute force in some claimed social and family values tends
to disregard the authorship of the Creator of the universe. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the binding force of the law is limited only to the weakest mem-
bers of the society, while those who are more powerful seem to be im-
mune of its effects and sanctions. The rule of power and wealth for selfish
interests and political ambitions seems to indicate a change in the pattern
of social rule. Nowadays, there are also talks and debates on the justifica-
tion of wars and revolutions. How can we consider them from the per-
spective of Locke’s natural law theory? Will it still be relevant to take
hold of those seventeenth century essays of Locke on matters of morals
and politics?
Now, in order to obtain a sound critical analysis of the concept of
the natural law, I find it exceedingly necessary to look into the main fount
of his theory, that is, the Essays; and then, to compare it with some of his
mature literary works, particularly the Essay and the Two Treatises. In this
thesis, I have worked on the three major concerns, namely, the life and
works of John Locke; the understanding of the natural law; and, the critical
analysis of the natural law theory. However, in this excerpt, I will limit my
presentation only to some significant and relevant points of the last two
parts, which I think will sufficiently cover and answer all the inquiries I
have proposed. In the following paragraphs, I will give a short descriptive
sketch of each general heading of the excerpt.
I. Understanding the natural law. Locke’s natural law theory is not
limited to only one work, since it can be found in several of his philosophi-
cal writings. There are many scattered considerations in his works that are
worthy of note and are of great importance in understanding his concept of
the natural law. Since they were written at different times and in different
contexts, the way in which Locke understood natural law was also very
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different. His approach and objective do not square from one text to ano-
ther. For that reason, I have divided the exposition into two separate stages
of his thought, namely, his early conception of the natural law during his
senior studentship in Oxford, and his mature scholarship. These two stages
correspond to, first, his earliest Essays; and second, his later works, partic-
ularly the Essay and the Two Treatises.
The first stage manifests the indebtedness of Locke to the Christian
classical notion of the natural law wherein the role of the divine will takes
the primary place. That posture, likewise, situates him among the propo-
nents of theological voluntarism. Nevertheless, his proposition of the
knowability of the natural law by the light of nature puts in doubt as to
whether his early thoughts were wholly of legal and theological traits. The
second stage, however, is a clear affirmation of his deviation from the clas-
sical conception of the natural law. His strong inclination to empirical theo-
ries weakened the voluntarist aspect of his natural law theory. By then, he
began to show a deeper appreciation of the power of rational faculties and
the role of sense-experience. In this regard, most scholars have put him
among the rationalists. Evidently, there is a notable change of mood in his
discussion of ethical problems in later works. This change is reasonable
because Locke had outlived the two critical stages of the history of Eng-
land, that is, before and after the Revolution of 1688.
The other considerations in this section deal with the later theologi-
cal concerns of Locke with the natural law. Particularly, in the Reason-
ableness of Christianity, he identified the natural law with the Law pro-
mulgated by Jesus Christ in the New Testament. Towards the end of his
life, he did not change his conviction that God is the sole origin of the nat-
ural law. His approach to the problem, however, appears more religious
than philosophical. With regard to his posterior conception of the natural
law in Ethics in General, he used a plainly ethical approach that is closer in
outlook to his hedonistic principles in the Essay.
II. Analysis and Appraisal. The second part of this excerpt deals
with a short historical evaluation and a thorough critical analysis of Locke’s
concept of the natural law. At great length, I will consider several current
ramifications of his natural law theory, which have direct implications in
Moral Philosophy. In this section of the thesis, I have emphasized only the
most innovative points of Locke’s concept of the natural law, such as the
distinguishing marks of the natural law, the individualism, the demonstra-
bility of the natural law, and the theistic absolutism and moral relativism
conflict.
Finally, it is of great importance that Locke’s natural law theory
find its place and relevance in the present global situation, especially con-
cerning the moral life of man. How can we value his natural law theory to-
day? What principles can it contribute, for example, to the communal fight
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against terrorism, in the preservation of one’s life, to, in the protection of
cultural patrimony and religious tradition? Locke had to witness in his life
the most complex political and religious situations, and he himself had to
escape from imminent danger to his life. If he were living today, would he
apply the same principles of his natural law theory, such as, an ultimate ap-
peal to heaven in case of any tyrannical aggression, or, a right to kill for
self-preservation?
In the Seventh Essay, Locke manifested himself not in favour of the
utility basis of the natural law, nonetheless, the current philosophical and
political trends seem to be inclined more and more on utilitarian moral the-
ory. The common good is clothed with the attraction of a pleasurable and
easy way of living, regardless of ethical principles. Will these situations be
a sufficient reason to propose and revive  Locke’s moral tenets. Looking at
the individual consciousness, there seems to be a deep personal concern for
one’s right and responsibility, however, in the context of Locke’s «state of
nature», the individual right is and can only be grounded on the principles
of the natural law. How applicable is this theory in the present times?
In the conclusion, I have gathered the corresponding answers to the
problems proposed in this work. The solutions are nothing but a result of
the investigation, and I don’t pretend to qualify them as an absolute and
definite response to the current moral situation. The least that the present
work can proudly expect is the growing awareness and concern for the ba-
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1. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW IN THE ESSAYS
In the previous chapter on the Works of John Locke, I made a general
introduction to the Essays, which I hope has served to situate us in its
historical and literary contexts. Now, it is convenient to show the major el-
ements that constitute the theory of the natural law which Locke developed
in his earliest essays. It is also of great interest to know whether Locke
conceived the natural law according to its classical notions or whether he
introduced some innovative views. It is plain, however, that he explain it in
a simple but descriptive way, intending primarily to impart it as part of his
scholastic lectures during his censorship in Christ Church. In this section, I
will underline the most salient points that surface after a thorough investi-
gation of the Essays.
1.1. THE NATURE AND EXISTENCE OF THE NATURAL LAW
1.1.1. Proofs of the existence of law
Locke did not present a pre-established definition of natural law,
but rather, following a more scholastic design, he delved into the core of
the problem by drawing out inexhaustibly some of the basic elements that
revolved around the concept of the natural law. His first attempt was to in-
quire as to its existence, which consequently led him to present its basic
nature. What are the proofs that certain laws really exist?
(i) The order and beauty of the universe. In the First Essay, Locke
relates the undeniable existence of law in the palpable beauty and order of
creation. This is the most tangible proof that nobody can deny, that by a
mere observation of the admirable things in the world, man can realize that
all these things must be designed with inherent orderly laws. Locke ap-
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peals to the traditional idea that there must be a divine Creator, all-wise
and all-powerful that governs the world, who, by his heavenly design, has
put the natural movements and operations of all created things. God has
willed the beauty and wonder of His work.
(ii) The life and destiny of man. Next to the beauty of creation,
Locke asserts that man is not exempted from any law, because God has
also a designed plan for his life and destiny. The life and death of all living
beings are under the laws of the Creator. It also indicates the work of the
Intelligent God who shows much concern for the good of man. 
It is clear, therefore, that in order to arrive at the knowledge of the
law, the first assertion must be the existence of God. The wonders of the
world are the proofs of the existence of an eternal design of God and His
governance. Locke says,
It is by His order that the heaven revolves in unbroken rotation, the
earth stands fast and the stars shine, and it is He who has set bounds even to
the wild sea and prescribed to every kind of plants the manner and periods
of germination and growth; it is in obedience to His will that all living be-
ings have their own laws of birth and life; and there is nothing so unstable,
so uncertain in this whole constitution of things as not to admit of valid and
fixed laws of operation appropriate to its nature1.
For Locke, it is such a folly to deny these very evident facts of the
existence of the law. Curiously, Locke grounded his assertion of the exis-
tence of the law and its divine author on some observable facts, which
some years later, in his collaboration with Boyle and Sydenham, he would
affirm with more conviction that all knowledge of man, to establish its va-
lidity, must have an empirical foundation.
1.1.2. Various names of the law
Starting from the cosmological consideration, Locke presents vari-
ous names by which this law is ordinarily known. He gives, at least, three
concrete names of this law, namely, the moral good or virtue; the right rea-
son; and the law of nature.
(i) The moral good or virtue, or in the words of Seneca, «that single
good which man ought to be content with, to which appertains so much
dignity, so much glory»2. What really pertains to this kind of law is the
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1. «nec quicquam sit in tota hac rerum natura tam vagum tam incertum quod
[“quae” – von Leyden] ratas fixasque non agnoscit operandi naturae suae convenientes
leges». ELN I, 108-109.
2. ELN I, 109.
idea of goodness that drives man towards it. It directs him towards the end,
which is the good in itself.
(ii) The right reason is understood here by Locke not as «the facul-
ty of understanding which forms trains of thought and deduces proofs, but
certain definite principles of action from which spring all virtues and
whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals»3. This name im-
plies closeness to moral relations, because what really lies behind this de-
notation is the conformity of the action with the rule of reason. It can be
said then that whatever is done according to the right reason is morally
good or just.
(iii) The law of nature is the most widely used name especially by
the Stoics, that is, «a law which each can detect merely by the light planted
in us by nature, to which also he shows himself obedient in all points and
which he perceives, is presupposed by the principle of his obligation; and
this is the rule of living according to nature»4.
The third denotation shows a closer connection with the norms of
morality and it adds an important element of the law, which is the role of
the light of nature. That solum lumine is a prevalent idea in the work of
Culverwel when he speaks of the candle of the Lord, which is consider-
ably explained also by St. Thomas Aquinas when he refers to the partici-
pation of the natural light in the divine light. There are four basic ele-
ments of the natural law that Locke highlights in the third name, that is,
the recognition of the law by the mere light of nature, the obedience to
the law, the rational basis of the obligation, and the rule of living accord-
ing to nature. All these elements reflect the mode of living that each man
has to follow, and in a sense, delineate the reason of the existence of nat-
ural law.
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4. «quisque eo solum lumine quod natura nobis insitum est detegere potest, cui
etiam per omnia se morigerum praestat, officii sui rationem postulare sentit». «se
morigerum praestat» was revised by von Leyden and he suggested the infinitive
«praestare» instead of praestat; then as to the next word, he supposed to have put et or
quam in order to clarify its sense. See ELN I, 110. Horwitz, (et. al.) similarly made a
correction on it. They supplied the word debet and quam before the word, officii. So,
in the translation by Horwitz it reads, «se morigerum praestare debet, quam…» that is,
«he ought to show himself obedient…» See John LOCKE, Questions concerning the
Law of Nature. Edited by Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay (Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 98-100. Hereafter direct quotations from Locke
will be referred to as QLN, and the introductory analysis of the editors will be referred
to as Horwitz, et. al., «Introduction».
1.1.3. Natural law is neither natural right nor natural light5
At first sight, these terms seem to refer to the same thing. Locke
employs them both, «right and light», in the Essays; however, he makes it
clear that these are distinct notions and one cannot be identified with the
other. He also clarifies the distinction between the law and natural right
both in its usage as well as in its meaning, and he says, «for right consists
in the fact that we have a free use of something, but law is that which either
commands or forbids some action»6.
In this context, Locke may have thought of the «limiting character»
of the law, as Pufendorf and Hobbes thought it is that which limits the free-
dom of man. On the other hand, St. Thomas Aquinas affirms that in the
strict sense, law and right cannot be identified with one another, since
«natural right is only a part of the natural law». Evidently, natural law cov-
ers all the virtues, while natural right covers particularly the virtue of jus-
tice, or to say it more correctly, «right is the object of justice»7.
Is the light of nature the same as the light of reason? Apparently
Locke uses both terms indistinctly, though sometimes he notes the pre-
cision of the term «the light of reason», for it better describes the par-
ticular faculty that rational beings possess. Natural light is understood
as the light planted in us by nature, in that sense, it can be considered
as coeval with the existence of man. Can there be a reason without nat-
ural light, so much so that it makes difficult the attainment of knowl-
edge? It is just an echo of the objections that Locke poses in the Second
Essay, where he admits that it is not the absence or the defect of the
mind’s faculty that impedes the attainment of knowledge, but rather the
improper use of it. He insists that, «careful reflection, thought, and at-
tention by the mind is needed in order that, by argument and reasoning,
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5. Ruiz-Gallardon introduces another term for natural law in her translation of the
Essays, that is, «una luz natural» assuming that Locke had used it to refer to the «ejer-
cicio conjunto de la sensación y la razón». However, she did not specify where and
when did John Locke use it as the natural law, which in fact is nowhere to be found in
the Essays, for the reason that Locke always applied it as the «means» to attain the
knowledge of natural law. The reference used by Ruiz-Gallardon is in the ELN II,
126, where Locke emphasizes the instrumentality of the light of nature: «legem scil-
icet naturae lumine naturae esse cognoscibilem». Ruiz-Gallardon (ed.), 82. See also
its corresponding endnote on page 164.
6. «Jus enim in eo positum est quod alicujus rei liberum habemus usum, lex vero
id est quod aliquid agendum jubet vel vetat». ELN I, 110. I prefer the English transla-
tion of the Horwitz’ edition because it is more clear. QLN, 101.
7. In the introduction and commentary to the q. 57 of the Spanish edition of the
Suma Teológica, the editors take note of the causality of the law with regards to the
right. «La ley es la causa y fuente primordial del derecho, y es llamada tal por ser el
principio formal y norma objetiva del mismo». S.T., II-II, q. 57, a.1, 196.
one may find a way from perceptible and obvious things into their hidden
nature»8.
What then is the light of nature? Locke’s notion of the light of nature
is implied in his answer to the main problem that he poses in the Second Es-
say: «Can the law of nature be known by the light of nature?» His answer is
affirmative. Definitely, Locke does not pretend to inquire into the meaning of
the light of nature, because his objective is to propose the manner in which
man comes to know the natural law. However, there is an assumption that he
would wish also to make clear the notion of the natural light. He states,
By saying that something can be known by the light of nature, we
mean nothing else but that there is some sort of truth to the knowledge of
which a man can attain by himself and without the help of another, if he
makes proper use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature9.
No doubt, Locke refers the light of nature to the faculty of the mind.
Von Leyden noted, the identification of the light of nature with the dis-
cerning power of man’s reason10 when he discussed the similarities of Cul-
verwel and Locke. However, von Leyden asserts that Locke identifies «the
law of nature as the law of reason, unwritten, and to be found only in the
minds of men; since it is made known by reason only»11.
Hence, it remains evident that the natural light plays the role of an
instrument in attaining the knowledge of the natural law. It is the means
that facilitates the discovery of the law; it assists the execution of the ac-
tions of man, especially in conforming them to the natural law. Nonethe-
less, there seems to be no inconvenience incalling the law of nature hyphen
«the law of reason».
1.1.4. Descriptive definition of the natural law
Hence this law of nature can be described as being the decree of the
divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and
what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason
commanding or prohibiting12.
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8. ELN II, 135.
9. «Homo recte utens iis facultatibus quibus a natura instructus est per se et sine
ope alterius devenire potest». Ibid., 123.
10. Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas does not identify the natural light with the nat-
ural law, but rather he calls it the «light of the natural reason», participating in the di-
vine light that is impressed in us. See S.Th., I-II, q. 91, a.2, 54.
11. VON LEYDEN, W., «Introduction», 80.
12. «Haec igitur lex naturae ita describi potest quod sit ordinatio voluntatis div-
inae lumine naturae cognoscibilis, quid cum natura rationali conveniens vel disconve-
niens sit indicans eoque ipso jubens aut prohibens». ELN I, 110-111.
I wish to underline the three major elements of this description,
which Locke himself takes into account and seems to consider always as
requisites of the natural law. He explains at length in the following argu-
ments that these requirements square much with the necessary elements of
the classical notion of the natural law, namely: (i) the decree of the divine
will; (ii) the prescription of what is and what is not to be done; and, (iii) the
binding force of its content13.
The first element refers to the source of the law, which Locke ac-
knowledges it to be a superior power, that is, one that supersedes all hu-
man institutions. A little later, he identifies it as the formal cause of the
law. The second element refers to the proper function of the law, which in
the terms of his predecessors, it is called «indicative or prescriptive» law,
that is to say, indicating what is and what is not to be done. The third ele-
ment shows the binding force of the law, for it commands or prohibits that
which is in conformity or not to the rational nature. Locke admits that its
obligatory nature is sufficiently included in the content itself of the law.
There is another important element that Locke mentions in the defi-
nition, which can be attributed as his own distinguishing mark, that is, the
cognoscibility by the light of nature. He refers to the possibility of know-
ing the law of nature by means of the special faculty endowed to man by
the Creator and which is proper to his human nature. It is, indeed, an im-
portant element which Locke explains extensively in the Essays, first, by
rejecting what others believed to be the means of obtaining the knowledge
of the law, and by affirming afterwards his own views on this matter.
The descriptive definition takes into account the essential role of
reason, though at the first sight, Locke sees it improper to call the natural
law as the dictate of reason, because he believes that, «Reason does not es-
tablish nor pronounce this law of nature ... (but) search for it and discover
it». Then, he continues enumerating the specific role of reason, namely,
«Reason is not the maker of that law ...but rather its interpreter; Reason
merely investigates that law; and, Reason cannot give us laws, since it is
only a faculty of our mind and part of us»14.
The above statements show that Locke is fully convinced of the di-
vine origin of the natural law. It does not imply, however, that he disre-
gards the power of reason, but he simply shows the priority of the natural
law over the light of nature. 
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13. The natural law consists in these three basic elements: (a) «declaratio volun-
tatis superioris, in quo consistere videtur legis ratio formalis; (b) quod legis est propri-
um, quid agendum sit vel omittendum praescribit; (c) homines obligat, omnia enim
quae ad obligationem requiruntur in se continet». ELN, 110/112.
14. «Nec legis illius author est sed interpres; nisi supreme legislatoris minuendo dig-
nitatem velimus rationi illam regem acceptam referre quam solum quaerit; nec enim ra-
tio, cum facultas solum animi sit et pars nostri, nobis dare leges potest». ELN I, 110-111.
The natural law can only come from a superior will, therefore, it
is something external to man. But, by the use of reason, man advances to
the knowledge of it and he begins to have dominion over his actions
thanks to the agreement of reason with the natural law. Man discovers
the Lawgiver and acknowledges the purpose of his life hidden in the
God-given law. In that sense, the law becomes the norms of living of
every human being.
1.1.5. Five arguments to prove the existence of the natural law
This is an extension of the first section that I have exposed above
about the proofs of the existence of the natural law, wherein I gave much
emphasis on the first premise, that is, the existence of God. In this section,
Locke amplifies these proofs with logical arguments and he develops them
in a more scholastic way. In every argument, he presents first the main
proposition, then, he follows it with some objections, replies, and exam-
ples. The most significant trait of these arguments is his explicatory sed
contra, because in them, he shows the inconvenience and irrationality of
not recognising the existence of the natural law.
The five arguments are grounded on the following facts or infer-
ences: (i) from the Aristotelian teleological argument; (ii) from man’s con-
science; (iii) from the world’s constitution; (iv) from the nature of the hu-
man society; and, (v) from the principles of virtue or vice.
First Argument. «The special function of man is the active exercise
of the mind’s faculties in accordance with rational principle»15. This
proposition underlines the teleological principle of Aristotle that every be-
ing tends to its end. Likewise, Locke admits that there is a special sort of
work each thing is designed to perform, which in the case of man, he con-
cludes that, according to Aristotle, «the proper function of man is acting in
conformity with reason, so much so that man must of necessity perform
what reason prescribes»16.
After this, Locke gives two objections to the main proposition, that
is, that such a law does not exist at all because it cannot be found any-
where, people still disagree as to its content; and, that even though the law
is known by the natural light, not all people who possess reason have
knowledge of it.
To these two objections, Locke gives his replies as follow:
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15. Locke quotes here the passage from Aristotle’s Nic. Ethics, Bk I, Ch. 7. ELN
I, 113.
16. ELN I, 113.
I admit that all people are by nature endowed with reason, and I say
that natural law can be known by reason, but from this it does not necessar-
ily follow that it is known to any and every one17.
And then he enumerates the causes of this ignorance or denial of
the natural law, that is, first, the improper use of the light of reason, or
simply by not using it and preferring to remain in darkness; second, bad
rearing of children, which results in a bad habit of life and evil customs,
thus making is difficult to distinguist between good and evil; third,
through natural defect, which weakens the use of faculties and the acu-
men of the mind becomes too dull; and, fourth, the violence of passions,
carelessness, inducements of pleasure or the urges base instincts, which
generally impede the exercise and dictates of reason. At the end, Locke
finally suggests that, after seeing the case, «not the majority of people
should be consulted but those who are more rational and perceptive than
the rest»18.
Regarding the second objection, Locke affirms that disagreement
on the matters of law or disputations on this subject is not an indication of
its inexistence, but it rather proclaims the existence of the law. He says,
I answer that, although even the more rational of men do not ab-
solutely agree among themselves as to what the law of nature is and what
its true and known precepts are, it does not follow from this that there is no
law of nature at all; on the contrary it follows rather that there is such a law,
when people contend about it so fiercely. (…) This fact rather establishes
the existence of the law more firmly, seeing that all the disputants maintain
the same idea about the law itself…. and they differ only in their interpreta-
tions of it19.
Second Argument. The argument from the conscience of man, as
von Leyden observes, is a suggestion to Locke in a letter by Gabriel Tow-
erson, with whom Locke had corresponded and collaborated during his
studentship in Oxford20. Whether Towerson had persuaded Locke on this
matter or not, I would say that both of them maintained the same argu-
ment, wherein a Pauline concept of conscience was drawn, that is, from
Romans 2:14-15. Locke’s reply is so clear, «no one who commits a wicked
action is acquitted in his own judgment. Thus the sentence which anyone




20. W. von Leyden has included this letter in his introductory remarks on the Es-
says. See W. VON LEYDEN, «Introducation», 9.
passes on himself testifies that there is a law of nature. (…) This law, then,
is not written, but innate, i.e, natural»21.
Third Argument. The very constitution of this world proves the ex-
istence of the natural law in two ways, that is, firstly from the prescriptions
of form, manner and measure of working proper to the nature of all created
things; and secondly, from the prescriptions on manner of acting suitable
to the nature of man, that is, as a rational being. Locke asserts that the con-
stitution of the world is a great proof of the existence of the natural law,
because «all things observe a fixed law of their operations and a manner of
existence appropriate to their nature»22.
Fourth Argument. Human society is another stronger source of ar-
gument with respect to the existence of the law of nature. Locke estab-
lished this argument on two basic elements of society, «a definite constitu-
tion of the state and form of government, and, secondly, the fulfilment of
pacts»23.
Locke underlines here the important role of the natural law in the
structure itself of human society and in the communal life of people. He
shows the demoralizing consequences if the natural law were not observed
both by the great mass of a society and by their leaders. This would imply the
fall of the community and the failure of the constitution of the state, which
would ultimately result in the rule of tyrannical and arbitrary leader(s).
Locke points out here some moral and political principles, which I
believe remain valid through the course of time. I find it relevant to cite
them here.
Certainly, positive civil laws are not binding by their own nature or
force or in any other way than in virtue of the law of nature, which orders
obedience to superiors and the keeping of public peace.
Thus, without this law, the rulers can perhaps by force and with the
aid of arms compel the multitude to obedience, but put them under an
obligation they cannot.
It is not to be expected that a man would abide by a compact be-
cause he has promised it, when better terms are offered elsewhere, unless
the obligation to keep promises was derived from nature, and not from the
human will24.
Fifth Argument. «Without natural law there would be neither virtue
nor vice, neither the reward of goodness nor the punishment of evil: there
is no fault, no guilt, where there is no law»25.
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Once again, Locke emphasizes the demoralizing consequences of
the absence of the natural law, but in this case, the bad effects fall on every
individual person. He insists that if everything were to depend on human
will, on personal utility or pleasure, or, on blind and lawless impulse, then,
morality would result in vain.
The terms «upright» and «virtuous» would disappear as meaning-
less or be nothing at all but empty names. (Then, his final arguments are
even more positive and compelling), since whatever honour or baseness our
virtues and vices possess they owe it all to this law of nature; for the nature
of good and evil is eternal and certain, and their value cannot be deter-
mined either by the public ordinances of men or by any private opinion26.
1.2. FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE AND BASIS OF THE NATURAL LAW
To inquire about the source of the natural law is to discover its ori-
gin, which implies getting into the main fount of its existence. The problem
at hand deals with the material and efficient causes of the natural law. Who
brings it into reality and what makes it exist? The points to consider here
are closely connected with the idea of the cognoscibility of the natural law,
which I presume, can bring some confusion.  Doubts can arise as to whether
the term «source» may also refer to the source of knowledge of the natural
law, which would imply the means of arriving at the truth of the law. There-
fore, in order to avoid confusion between the source of knowledge and the
source of natural law, it is necessary to establish a precise understanding of
the question.
In the strict sense, to inquire into the source of knowledge of the
natural law means to take hold of a rational process, which includes the use
of sense-perception and reasoning. It is, properly speaking, a process of
knowing. It implies the application of the rational faculties endowed by
God to every human being. It answers the question, how can man arrive to
the knowledge of the natural law? This is not the interest of the present in-
quiry, as it will be extensively discussed in the following section on the
cognoscibility of the natural law.
It remains obvious therefore that to talk about the fundamental
source of the natural law is to inquire not into the process of knowing but
rather as to the origin of this law. The question is simple: what is the origin
of the natural law? In some other parts of the Essays, Locke investigates
the basis of the natural law. What does he mean by the basis of the natural
law? In the Eighth Essay he declares,
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By the basis of natural law we mean some sort of groundwork on
which all other and less evident precepts of that law are built and from
which in some way they can be derived, and thus they acquire from it all
their binding force in that they are in accordance with that, as it were, pri-
mary and fundamental law which is the standard and measure of all other
laws depending on it27.
For the purpose of a more schematic exposition, I will draw out the
matter in three sub-sections, that is, a) God, the only source of the natural
law; b) On the basis of the common consent of men; and, c) On the basis of
utility.
1.2.1. God, the only source of the natural law
Locke maintained his main view on this matter since he started to
deal with the concept of the natural law. God is the only author of the law,
He is the Lawgiver; and out of his wisdom and goodness He endows man
with the capacity to know it and to perform his actions in accordance with
this law. Man is the recipient of the natural law; he is the most privileged
creature that by the eternal design of God, He made it known to him by
means of the light of nature. It is plain, therefore, that the natural law has a
divine and eternal origin; it is a decree of the divine superior will.
To admit the divine origin of the natural law is to admit the sole au-
thorship of God and to deny its attribution to man. Locke is consistent in
his affirmation of the efficient cause of the natural law, who is God him-
self. In the Fourth Essay, Locke clearly shows in two premises the origin
of all things and of the law. He states,
We say that the mind, after more carefully considering in itself the
fabric of this world … thence proceeds to an inquiry into their origin, to
find out what was the cause, and who the maker, of such an excellent
work… Hence it is undoubtedly inferred that there must be a powerful and
wise creator of all these things. (Then a little later, he also acknowledges
God’s authorship of those commands, rewards, and punishments). Reason
lays down that there must be some superior power to which we are rightly
subject, namely God who has a just and inevitable command over us and at
His pleasure can raise us up or throw us down, and make us by the same
commanding power happy or miserable28.
In between these arguments Locke explains that this power and au-
thority cannot come from man, for he cannot create himself, he does not
JOHN LOCKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 37
27. ELN VIII, 205.
28. ELN IV, 153 & 155.
owe his origin to himself, and most especially because man does not find
in himself all those perfections of which his mind can conceive29. There-
fore, its origin cannot be traced to man himself, although he has a partici-
pation in that law, and that is, particularly in the process of knowing it.
Locke and his predecessors have commonly agreed that the cause
of the natural law is something superior and exterior to man. Some expres-
sions like ordinatio voluntatis divinae, or, declaratio superioris voluntatis
frequently appear in the major works of Locke, which in effect, confirm
his indebtedness to his scholastic antecedents. These inferences and the
emphasis that Locke gives to the divine will apparently put him in the vol-
untarist camp of the natural law theory.
All his previous propositions concerning the existence and nature
of the natural law reaffirm his basic argument that there can only be one
source of it, that is, the superior divine will. God is the principal author and
maker of that law, and He impressed it in the hearts of all men.
1.2.2. On the basis of the common consent of men 
Since we have already affirmed that the natural law has a divine
and eternal origin, we would contradict the first argument had we estab-
lished its basis on the common consent of men and on man’s own interest.
By proposing these views, Locke pretends to accommodate other percep-
tions about the foundation of the natural law, not in order to accept them as
its true basis, but rather to highlight its exclusive divine origin. In that
sense, what I propose to explore now is Locke’s reasoning for not accept-
ing them as the real basis of the natural law.
With regards to the common consent of men, Locke points out that
it cannot be the basis of the natural law for its deficient nature; and its defi-
ciency is manifested in the instability and particularity of the generally
agreed laws or norms of conduct. It is clear that the common consent of
men on a certain law can have validity and effect only in a limited space
and time, and that in some other places and in some other times, such kinds
of law could not have the same binding force.
If the general consent of men is to be regarded as the rule of moral-
ity, there will either be no law of nature at all or it will vary from place to
place, a thing being morally good in one place and wrong in another, and
the vices themselves will become duties30.
Therefore, common consent cannot be accepted as the standard and
measure of all other laws for its relative and temporal character. Locke
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puts it among the list of beliefs, because it lacks the proof and the certitude
of being a moral code of conduct.
Admittedly, such a general consent might point to a natural law,
but it could not prove it; it might make me believe more ardently, but could
not make me know with greater certainty, that this opinion is a law of na-
ture31.
1.2.3. On the basis of utility
Now regarding the basis of utility, Locke identifies first the main
argument in favour of the utilitarian principles. He quotes the account of
Carneades’ argument wherein the changeability of legal codes depends on
the people’s manners and customs, and on the passionate impulse of seek-
ing the self-preservation. He underlines the key point of the question in the
following:
Is it true that what each individual in the circumstances judges to be
of advantage to himself and his affairs is in accordance with natural law,
and on that account is not only lawful for him but also unavoidable, and
that nothing in nature is binding except so far as it carries with it some im-
mediate personal advantage?32
This implies that the natural law is subject to or conforms to the ad-
vantage of each individual. It appears plainly that the objection carries a
subjective connotation of the law. However, Locke denies it definitely for
three following reasons.
First, «it is impossible for something to be the basis of natural law
or to be the principal law, which is not the ground of the binding force of
other, less universal, laws of that same nature»33. Then, Locke supports his
argument with factual evidences of those great men who earned immortal-
ity, excellence, and greatness not through personal interests and advan-
tages but through heroic observance of virtues and at the risk of personal
loss. Locke admires those heroes who pursued the advantage of the com-
monwealth and of all mankind. Moreover, he reasons that «if it were the
principal law of nature that each man should be mindful of himself and his
own affairs, those noble examples of virtue which the record of history
have hallowed would have to be consigned to oblivion»34. Then finally he
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adds that if this were the case, it «would open the door to every kind of vil-
lainy».
Secondly, «it is impossible that the primary law of nature is such
that its violation is unavoidable»35. Locke sees the necessary violation of
the utilitarian principle as evident because it is impossible «to have regard
for the interests of all at one and the same time». Besides, he observes that
one’s concern for his own advantage, his own life, his prosperity and secu-
rity, always brings with it as a consequence the expense of another’s hap-
piness, good, and even of another’s life.
Thirdly, in continuation of the previous statement, he underlines the
obvious consequence of law based on utility, that is, the loss of value of
some virtues in the life of men.
It is impossible for any principle to be the basis of natural law,
whereby, if it is laid down as true, all justice, friendship, and generosity are
taken away from life. (…) In truth one may observe here briefly that the
upholders of this doctrine seek the principles of moral action and a rule to
live by in men’s appetites and natural instincts rather than in the binding
force of a law, just as if that was morally best which most people desired36.
In that sense, it appears clearly that men’s appetites and instincts
condition the binding force of the natural law; and this law likewise loses
its force and validity when it loses too its usefulness to every individual.
For Locke, the observance of the natural law may give advantage to every
individual, such as the attainment of happiness, still it cannot be inferred
that its basis is man’s own interest, because, Locke declares, «Utility is not
the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of
obedience to it»37. Thus, Locke concludes that the proposition in favour of
the utility basis is contrary to reason and completely absurd. Towards the
end, he affirms that «the rightness of an action does not depend on its utili-
ty; on the contrary, its utility is a result of its rightness»38.
1.3. COGNOSCIBILITY OF THE NATURAL LAW
In the Second Essay Locke poses this question: «Can the law of na-
ture be known by the light of nature?» He gives an affirmative reply. I
have obliquely glanced at the main point of this question in the previous
section, that is, whether the law of nature that God gives to all men is
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knowable (Latin, cognoscibilis); if so, by what means and in what order is
it known? Locke exposed his own understanding of the cognoscibility of
the natural law in a deductive manner, that is, by presenting some possible
avenues of knowing the law, from which he retained only that which was
evidently the most indisputable means.
To proceed with this exposition, I propose to ask some related ques-
tions that can help us get into the main point of the problem. For example,
does the natural law possess of a qualitative character that enables man to
know it? Is man, with the sole use of the light of nature, capable of know-
ing the natural law without any external assistance? Does the cognoscibili-
ty of the natural law depend solely on the will of God or on the rationality
of man? If God has endowed man with intellective faculties, then, is it
right to say finally that the origin of knowledge is God himself? What then
is the role of reason if knowledge of anything is attributed to the author
and creator of all things? Similar questions have led to the interminable de-
bate between the rationalist and the voluntarist camps of the natural law
theorists. Nonetheless, I think it necessary to establish at once what was re-
ally in the mind of Locke about this matter.
There are scattered discussions about the means of knowing the law
of nature in the entire book of the essays. For example, in the Second Es-
say he starts the exposition by affirming his main thesis that the law of na-
ture can be known by the light of nature. Likewise, he also discusses there
the three kinds of knowledge, or, the three possible avenues to attain the
knowledge of the natural law, namely, by inscription, tradition, and sense-
experience. And finally, he adds a fourth kind of knowledge, which is de-
rived from the supernatural and divine revelation, but he does not give it
much attention, for it concerns another science. He dedicates the whole
Third Essay in the discussion of the knowledge by inscription. Then in the
Fourth Essay he proceeds to discuss knowledge through sense experience,
and the knowledge of specify from the general consent of men. For a more
orderly exposition, I will follow this sequence: that is, knowledge by in-
scription, by tradition, from the general consent, and by sense-experience
and reason.
1.3.1. Knowledge by inscription
In the Second Essay Locke states clearly that the knowledge by in-
scription implies that «this law of nature is inborn in us and is so implanted
by nature in the minds of all»39. To admit this argument means to eliminate
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all other avenues of knowledge, because man will need not be informed
and educated anymore about his way of living, his conduct, and the moral
precepts that he has to follow, since it is innate. Since everything is already
implanted in the mind of man, and provided that man uses his reason prop-
erly, Locke affirms that man «can attain to the knowledge of this law with-
out any teacher instructing him in his duties, any monitor reminding him of
them»40. The Third Essay is even more precise in ascertaining the meaning
of «knowledge by inscription» where he says,
But by our inquiry whether the law of nature is written in the souls
of men we mean this: namely, whether there are any moral propositions in-
born in the mind and as it were engraved upon it such that they are as nat-
ural and familiar to it as its own faculties, the will, and the understanding,
and whether, unchangeable as they are and always clear, they are known to
us without any study or deliberate consideration41.
The entire Third Essay is a long argument that proves the falsity of
this proposition, and Locke is firmly convinced that these are undeniable
facts, showing that «inscription» is not the proper avenue of knowledge. It
appears that he is totally against the theory of innate ideas, because not
only in the Essays does he emphasize his counter propositions but he also
dedicates the greater part of book one to its refutation. He underlines a
long list of reasons to prove that no principles are inscribed in men from
birth, neither speculative nor practical. In the following paragraphs, I will
lay down briefly the five arguments of Locke against the assertion that nat-
ural law is inscribed in the minds of men.
First argument. Locke begins by asserting that the Cartesian doc-
trine of innate ideas is fallible and cannot be proven. Both editors of the
Essays, von Leyden and Howritz et.al., recognize the conviction of Locke
that Descartes is the chief exponent of modern innatism. They show the
change that Locke made in the original Latin text –in eo laborabunt multi–
for laborat acutissimus Car[t]esius. Locke admits convincingly that the
Cartesian principle is just «an empty assertion and no one has proved it
until now»42. He finds no convincing arguments to prove that the souls of
men when they are born are more than empty tablets, –praeter rasas tabu-
las– that is to say, that there is something in the mind already, which as
Locke describes, «such that they are as natural and familiar to it as its own
faculties, the will, and the understanding». The Latin adverb praeter that
Locke employs in this argument insinuates his notable empirical position
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that knowledge is acquired through experience, since the minds are origi-
nally empty tablets. He did not yet proceed to discuss his empiricist point
of view because his only concern at that moment was to show the lack of
proofs of the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas and its inability to provide
convincing arguments.
Second argument. Locke shows the knotty problem of accepting
this proposition that knowledge is acquired by inscription, especially the
fact that there exist many differences among nations and in different times
in their conceptions of natural law. If all ideas are implanted in the souls of
men when they are born, then, all men must have the same notion of law
and follow the same norms of conduct. However, he observes that with
respect to the natural law,
(All men) differ so very widely, one rule of nature and right reason
being proclaimed here, another there, one and the same thing being good
with some people, evil with others, some recognizing a different law of na-
ture, others none; but all see in it something obscure43.
Others have argued that the differences are due to the Fall of Adam,
in such a way that the «natural law has been partly erased or absolutely and
altogether effaced»44. Locke shows the falsity and deficiency of this inferen-
ce, for if the natural law has been partly erased, that which remains must
be common to all men and at least be universally obeyed or acknowledged,
and yet, the facts prove the contrary. On the other hand, if this law is alto-
gether effaced, then, Locke finally assumes, it would hardly be found any-
where. Since one or the other reasoning does not resolve the differences,
the knowledge by inscription remains unacceptable.
Third argument. There are two contrary views that Locke proposes
in the third argument. In the first place, with regard to younger boys, illit-
erate people, and primitive races who have not received any formation or
moral education, they are presumed to live only according to the law of na-
ture inscribed in their hearts. But Locke observes that, «If the law of nature
were written in the hearts of men, one would have to believe that among
these people it will be found undiminished and unspoiled45. Yet history,
where Locke establishes his argument, has proven this untrue and even
witnessed the worst of the evildoings of these people. In the second place,
with regards to cultured and literate people who from the beginning have
learned to practise certain customs and follow such kinds of opinions ins-
tilled in their minds, without questioning their source or objecting to their
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authority, believe them to be the first principles and therefore inscribed in
them by nature.
In the first case, for those who live as if there were no principles of
goodness or rightness at all, Locke concludes by saying,
Thus the law of nature does not appear to be written in the hearts of
men, if those who have no other guide than nature itself and among whom
the decrees of nature are least spoiled by arbitrary moral customs live in
such ignorance of every law, as though there were no principle of rightness
and goodness to be had at all46.
In the second case, those who believe that they live according to the
first principles, Locke has this to say,
From all this, therefore, it is clear that there can exist many things
which anyone may believe to be inscribed in his mind by nature, which
nevertheless derive their origin from some other source, and that it does not
follow that, just because we eagerly believe in something and cherish it as
principle, though we are ignorant of its source, this is the law of nature
written in our hearts by nature47.
Fourth argument. In the case of the foolish and insane, Locke ar-
gues that since they are deficient of the knowledge of the natural law, it is
unreasonable to say that the law of nature is inscribed in the souls of men.
The foolish and insane were born as complete human beings, that is, con-
stituted of body and soul the same as the wise and learned people. If the
soul is the recipient of this knowledge, then the foolish must not be devoid
of it, however, the facts prove the contrary. It is enlightening to consider
the little note of von Leyden on the little dependence –minime pendent– of
the principles to the structure of the body.
Comparing Locke’s argument with the Essay, von Leyden observes
that «the clause may be translated thus: [why do the foolish and insane
have no knowledge of it?], “since (as they say) it is in the soul itself that
those principles are immediately impressed which at least depend on the
constitution and structure of the body’s organs”»48. Locke admits that, in
that aspect, there is only a minimum difference between the foolish and the
wise.
Fifth argument. Locke refers to the assumption that if the law of na-
ture were written in the hearts of men, then, there would be speculative and
practical principles in it. «But this seems difficult to prove; … Thus, it ap-
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pears to me that no principles, either practical or speculative, are written in
the minds of men by nature»49. He gives an example of one speculative
principle, such as «it is impossible that the same thing should at the same
time both be and not be», to prove that no man has had this knowledge by
inscription, but rather has learned the principle from another or discovered
it by himself through the process of induction.
1.3.2. Knowledge from tradition
The second kind of knowledge is that which is derived from tradi-
tion. What does it mean to say that the natural law can be obtained from
tradition and what kind of moral precepts are these? Locke refers these
moral precepts to the «second hand rules of conduct; customs of society
and common opinion of the people»50, being handed to us by our parents or
by any civil educator. He does not deny that this knowledge passes through
our senses and can be transmitted to us by other people, but he does not ac-
cept «that tradition is a primary and certain way of knowing the law of na-
ture»51.
On this point, he is firmly convinced that there is a big difference
between knowledge and belief. Moreover, it is undeniable that these rules
of conduct and customs may be good in themselves, but still he insists that
«it is not what reason but what men tell us»52. Those people, who act ac-
cording to the norms they received from tradition, perform dutiful acts as-
suming that these are in conformity with the natural law, but in reality,
they are only guided by belief and approval of the elders. Locke argues
persuasively on the basis of three propositions that the true knowledge of
natural law cannot be obtained from tradition.
First proposition. Locke identifies two major inconveniences in ad-
mitting the knowledge from tradition: first, the variety of traditions; and
second, the uncertainty of authority. The first inconvenience is evident in
any society, because in every place there exists one or more traditions,
meaning to say, there exists a variety of social customs and common opin-
ions of the people. The big problem that arises from there is not only the
multiplicity of traditions but also the differences among them, and worst of
all, even in the same society one tradition may be totally opposed to another.
Consequently, if the natural law is known from tradition, it will be hard to
determine which of them is the true tradition and which is the false one. It
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will be impossible to find the truth in them, and natural law will no longer
be everywhere one and the same. Similarly, this confusion leads the way to
the ambiguity of the authority. If every originator of tradition claims to be
the real one and that theirs is the certain spring of norms of morals and
conduct, and if people will be required to follow each one of them, then the
crisis of supreme authorship follows. Which authority then is worthy of
trust? From these grounds, Locke’s conclusion is clear:
For since the law of nature is everywhere one and the same, but tra-
ditions vary, it follows either that there is no law of nature at all, or that it
cannot be known by means of tradition53.
Second proposition. Tradition is a matter of trust, not of knowl-
edge; hence, what really emerges there is not a natural law but a «derived»
law. Locke insists, and it has been his consistent doctrine, that knowledge
depends on the evidence of facts. Now, since tradition is a matter of belief
in authority, it cannot be the means of knowing the natural law. Man gives
his assent not because he finds the thing reasonable and true, but because
he believes and trusts the giver of the law. Once again, Locke manifests
here his main preoccupation with the empirical grounding of knowledge.
Third proposition. By tracing the origin of a tradition or the first au-
thor who had transmitted this law, Locke arrives at three possible sources
or origins of that law. First, that the originator of the tradition finds «the
law of nature inscribed within his heart» (by inscription); second, that the
author comes to know it «by means of reasoning from the facts perceived
by the senses» (by sense-experience); or third, it is possible that the person
in question «was instructed by some oracle or inspired by a divine mes-
sage, then a law of this kind and promulgated in this manner is by no
means a law of nature, but a positive law», (by supernatural and divine
revelation)54.
Hence, from the basis of these the three propositions, Locke made it
clear that the natural law cannot be known from the tradition.
1.3.3. Knowledge from the general consent of men
To infer that the law of nature can be known from the general con-
sent of men is to open another vast horizon of inquiry. Indeed, Locke dedi-
cates the entire Fifth Essay to this topic. Effectively, the importance of this
matter has to be taken into account because it carries with it some serious
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and relevant ethical implications. Locke plunged into the discussion of the
general consent, without restricting himself to the cognoscibility of the
natural law, but rather opportunely extending the topic to some ethical
principles.
I must warn that general consent, in a certain sense, is considered
also as a basis, or possible source of the natural law, but as I have shown
already, for Locke, the only and ultimate source of the natural law is God,
the divine Lawmaker. Thus, Locke has not accepted common consent as
the basis of the natural law. Here I will try to show how Locke deals with it
as one of the possible avenues of knowledge.
The first thing that Locke brought to light is the connotation of terms
and the classification of the different types of general consent. Before go-
ing to the main point, he makes a revolting comment regarding maxim
vox populi vox Dei, which served as a prelude to his ethical considerations
and to his endless empirical concerns with the natural law. He proved the
fallacy of this argument by resorting to the unhappy memory of the past
and to the multitude of evils that this maxim had brought into the world,
and continues to mislead many people. By simply looking at the disorders
and immoralities that occurred in history, for Locke, it would be a great
deception to advocate the maxim vox populi vox Dei. Perforce he de-
clares:
If we should listen to this voice as if it were the herald of a divine
law, we should hardly believe that there was any God at all….And surely,
if this voice were the voice of God, it would be exactly the opposite of that
first fiat whereby He created and furnished this world, bringing order out of
chaos55.
Therefore, as history itself has testified to these malfeasances, the
natural consent of men cannot be an avenue for the knowledge of the law
of nature.
Kinds of the general consent. There are two divisions of this con-
cept, a) the positive consent, and, b) the natural consent. The positive con-
sent is that which arises from a contract, likewise understood in two ways,
either from a tacit contract, or from an expressly stated contract. A tacit
contract is an unstated agreement that is inspired by the common interests
of men and their convenience. They are contracts which exist without an
official settlement between concerned nations, for example, the safe pas-
sage of envoys. The other contract is expressly stated, that is, by a common
agreement among concerned nations that have convened for that sake, like,
the fixed boundary-lines between neighbouring peoples.
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This kind of contract is visibly lived nowadays in the different
leagues of nations, or in a community of neighbouring countries, such as
the European Community, the United Nations Organization, and the like.
According to Locke’s principles, «all this general consent derived from the
contract does not prove a natural law, but should rather be called the law of
nations, which is not imposed by the law of nature but has been suggested
to men by common expediency»56. He excludes general consent as a means
of knowing the natural law because it depends not on the natural princi-
ples, but rather on common agreement, which is born of pressing need and
common interests.
The second type of consent is called natural, because «men are led
by a certain natural instinct without the intervention of some compact»57.
Hereafter follows a long discussion of the three kinds of natural consent,
namely, (i) that which concerns moral behaviour; (ii) that which concerns
moral opinions; and, (iii) that which concerns first principles.
Concerning moral behaviour. This is a kind of consent by which
the manners and conduct of the majority of men, their example, become
the norms of living. Locke dismisses this natural consent as the way of
knowing the natural law, «for if what is rightful and lawful were to be de-
termined by men’s way of living, moral rectitude and integrity would be
done for»58. He finds this way undeniably destructive because those whose
lives would inbare these norms often live in servitude of all kinds of im-
moralities. A bad life cannot guarantee a good moral code, and much more
it does not prove the natural law. On the contrary, Locke proposes a way
out of this absurd notion of natural consent to as natural law. He says,
The law of nature is to be inferred not from men’s behaviour but
from their innermost ways of thinking –we must search not the lives but
their souls– for it is there that the precepts of nature are imprinted and the
rules of morality lie hidden together with those principles which men’s
manners cannot corrupt; and that since these principles are the same in
every one of us, they can have no other author than God and nature59.
Concerning moral opinions. This is what the above citation on
Locke is all about. This natural consent concerns the innermost convic-
tions of men about morality: that which men’s consciences acknowledge.
It tackles not only the morals of men, but also what men thought about
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those morals, so that common opinions prevail as lawful and become the
basis of the natural law.
The problem at hand is to discover whether moral opinions, since
they are rooted in the thoughts of men and have their consciences as firm
support, do play a vital role in knowing the natural law. Locke reiterates
his rebut to the notion that differences in traditions and opinions over time
and space show the fallacy of an argument for a natural law. Locke sup-
ports his argument as follows,
For while men, led by the prevailing opinion, have performed this
or that according to the moral practice of their country (though perhaps,
and not without reason, it appeared to others wrong and wicked) they did
not think they had transgressed the law of nature but rather had observed it;
they felt no pangs of conscience nor that inward mental scourge which usu-
ally punishes and torments the guilty, for they believed that their action,
whatever it may have been, was not only lawful but laudable60.
The moral opinions of men vary from place to place, and from one
time to another, as history and great writers of the ancient times have tes-
tified. Locke enumerates a long list of illustrations on distinct and various
practices of virtues, or vices camouflaged as virtues, like justice. Locke
cites Aristo who claims that thefts of all kinds were lawful, and Cato who
says that ‘thieves committing private theft spend their lives in prison and
in chains; public thieves, in gold and in purple’. Whereas regarding modes-
ty and chastity, polygamy is regarded here as a sin, there as a right, in
one place is commanded by law, in another is punished by death. Worst
still was the duty towards parents. At one remote time parricide was con-
sidered a duty of piety, for there were some who believed (in Sardinia)
that it would be wrong if those who are already old remained alive any
longer61.
There are more terrifying, unreasonable, and awful examples that
he mentions in the Fifth Essay, but I think there is one salient thing that is
worth considering. It is not surprising to find a variety of immoral practices
and differences of opinion of what is good and what is bad, if even con-
cerning first principles men do not agree with one another. There is no rea-
son and no gain in appealing to either more civilized nations, or philoso-
phers of a sounder mind because they too have disregarded even the belief
in God and the immortality of souls. In that sense, without a second
thought, we can infer that the natural law cannot be found in the general
consent of men. So in the final analysis, Locke has this to say,
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Admittedly, such a general consent might point to a natural law,
but it could not prove it; it might make me believe more ardently, but could
not make me know with greater certainty, that this opinion is a law of na-
ture. In fact, I cannot know with certainty whether the opinion of each indi-
vidual severally is a law of nature; this is a matter of belief, not of knowl-
edge. [At the end, his conclusion is much more convincing]: knowledge
precedes general consent62.
Concerning first principles. This kind of consent regarding first
principles makes reference to that natural instinct of men towards self-evi-
dent truths or tautological propositions. Locke admits that men are com-
pelled to assent these first principles readily and without any trace of
doubt. He did not give much attention to it for the reason that «speculative
principles do not pertain to the matter under discussion and do not affect
moral facts in any respect whatever»63.
However, in the original Latin text, von Leyden makes a little ob-
servation on the passage deleted by Locke, which seemingly indicated his
first notion of self-evident principle, that is, the principle of non-contradic-
tion which says: it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.
Locke reserves a more detailed explanation of the speculative principles
especially in his later major work, the Essay64.
1.3.4. Knowledge by way of reason and sense-experience
Hence, of all the propositions, Locke accepts only the remaining
one, which he believes to be the indisputable way to arrive at the knowl-
edge of the natural law and that which many thinkers accept. This is the
proposition that natural law is known by way of reason and sense-experi-
ence.
The previous sections have laid down the first premises of this in-
ference, indicating that neither from inscription nor from tradition nor
from the general consent can knowledge of natural law be derived. Like-
wise, he skipped the consideration of knowledge by divine revelation be-
cause it was outside of this philosophical concern; so that, what really re-
mains to tackle here is the role of the natural light, that is, the sensitive and
intellective faculties that every rational creature possesses. In this regard,
I find it more fitting to note some related considerations that may have
important implications in the present study. I will try to inquire as to
whether the natural law in itself is intelligible, or whether its knowledge is
50 JERRY GAELA ESPERANZA
62. ELN V, 177-179.
63. Ibid., 179.
64. See for example, Essay I.1.18 and IV.7.4.
demonstrable. Then, I will look at whether there are impediments that
make difficult for man the acquisition of the knowledge of moral truths,
and finally, I will inquire as to the necessary means in man’s quest for the
truth about the natural law.
Significance of the natural light. Locke opens the Second Essay
with an affirmative argument regarding the positive role of the light of na-
ture in attaining the knowledge of the natural law, as opposed to other
ways of knowledge discussed above. Then he proceeds to explain the
meaning of this avenue of knowledge. He says,
By saying that something can be known by the light of nature, we
mean nothing else but that there is some sort of truth to the knowledge of
which man can attain by himself and without the help of another, if he
makes use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature65.
It is in the Fourth Essay where he identifies more precisely the nat-
ural light with those two faculties that by his very nature man is endowed
with, namely, reason and sense-perception. Then he explains further,
For only these two faculties appear to teach and educate the minds
of men and to provide what is characteristic of the light of nature, namely
that things otherwise wholly unknown and hidden in darkness should be
able to come before the mind and be known and as it were looked into66.
From these two statements, some points are worthy further of con-
sideration, such as the sort of truth hidden in the knowledge; the capacity
of man to attain it without the help of another; the proper use of the facul-
ties man is endowed with; and the process of knowing, that is, from totally
unknown to known things. Locke makes allusions to this process of know-
ing by the light of nature to explain that there can be no innate ideas in the
minds of men when they are born. He maintains his theory that the knowl-
edge of the natural law, like all other fundamental believes or primary no-
tions, enters the mind through the influence of sense-experience upon rea-
son. This assertion leads him to admit, later on, the possibility of a science
of demonstrated ethics, which von Leyden assumes to be one of Culver-
wel’s influences on Locke.
Intelligibility of things and perception. On the mutual relation be-
tween the knowing subject and the known object, I propose some questions
that can help clarify the process of intellection. Is the natural law, as objec-
tively and separately considered, intelligible in itself? Or is it the rational
character of man that facilitates the discovery of the intelligibility of the
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things? In the first place, it is obviously clear that one thing cannot be con-
sidered without the other, that is to say, the known object and the knowing
subject. Locke equally admits that the content of natural law, that is, the
moral truths that are the standard rule of actions, is cognoscible. But in order
to prove its cognoscibility, we have to follow some basic steps, which are,
properly speaking, the process of intellection. In this regard, Locke shares
the idea of Culverwel, and von Leyden observes that they both admit that.
Such first principles … are gradually acquired by the observation
and comparison of objects … When first principles, being either specula-
tive or practical, are combined and give rise to secondary notions, all sorts
of conclusions can be drawn, amongst them the dictates of the law of na-
ture67.
The perception of things is the first step in the acquisition of knowl-
edge. Locke declares categorically in the Second Essay that man comes to
the knowledge of natural law through the things that he perceives. He men-
tions this theory in his prior discussion on tradition, where he gives step by
step the process of deducing the truth about the law of nature.
But since we are searching now for the principle and origin of the
knowledge of this law and for the way in which it becomes known to
mankind, I declare that the foundation of all knowledge of it is derived
from those things which we perceive through our senses. From these
things, then, reason and the power of arguing, which are both distinctive
marks of man, advance to the notion of the maker of these things (…) and
at last they conclude and establish for themselves as certain that some De-
ity is the author of all these things. As soon as it is laid down, the notion of
the universal law of nature binding on all men necessarily emerges68.
So clear and so convincing is this statement that it almost closes the
argument. Although in the same statement, Locke himself admits that «this
will become clear later on». He is referring to the Fourth Essay where he
exposes at length and depth the knowledge through reason and sense-expe-
rience. His proposition advocates a scholastic background, which he him-
self truly acknowledges his indebtedness to, most especially on his classical
notions of Logic and Metaphysics from Aristotle to St. Thomas Aquinas.
One thing is clearly inferred until here, that all knowledge, includ-
ing the knowledge of the first principles of morality, departs from the real-
ity of the things around us. Thus, he recognizes the important role of the
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senses. Locke is continuously alluding, between the Second and the Fourth
Essays, to the Aristotelian rule that all reasonings are «ex praecognitis et
praeconcessis»69; that in his own words, he says, «nothing indeed is
achieved by reason, that powerful faculty of arguing, unless there is some-
thing posited and taken for granted»70.
Going back to the first inquiry, we can say therefore that God’s
work of creation, all things as they are, and as long as they exist, possess in
themselves a qualitative character of intelligibility71. Because of the intelli-
gibility of the world, there is no more ground to doubt that men can come
to know the natural law through the light of nature.
Up to this point, one thing appears evident: that without the primary
objects, it is impossible to proceed to the following steps of knowing. The
things perceived serve as its starting point, and nobody denies their intelli-
gibility. These perceived objects are indispensable prerequisites for any ra-
tional operation. Locke admits various ways by which men can arrive at
the knowledge of the natural law, that is, by considering the ‘motion,
change, all qualities of perceptible objects, art and fixed order in the uni-
verse, etc. Definitely, all these things lead to the notion and recognition of
the Creator, and consequently, of the Legislator. There is no doubting this
first proposition, which most philosophers admit without any inconve-
nience. The problem comes from the consideration of the knowing subject,
that is to say, the role of reason and sense-perception. So I propose to con-
sider the ideas of Locke on the relation between the senses and reason.
How do these faculties work in the process of knowing?
The role of the senses and reason. Logically, Locke would not sepa-
rate one thing from the other, that is, to explain the role of the senses in one
place and the reason in another; or distribute the topics in compartmental
manner. Everything is explained in view of other related things. Thus, we
can observe that whenever Locke talks about the senses, he makes allusion
also to the reason. What does he mean by reason? In the Fourth Essay,
Locke maintains that,
(Reason is) the discursive faculty of the mind, which advances
from things known to things unknown and argues from one thing to anoth-
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er in a definite and fixed order of propositions. It is this reason by means of
which mankind arrives at the knowledge of natural law72.
With respect to its relation to the senses, Locke says, «with sense-
perception showing the way, reason can lead us to the knowledge of a law-
maker or of some superior power to which we are necessarily subject»73.
Then he continues praising this distinctive rational feature of man
with respect to the brutes, «whereas there is nowhere a nation so uncivi-
lized and so far removed from any culture as not to rejoice in the use of the
senses and not to surpass brute animals in the use of reason and the faculty
of arguing, though perhaps it has not sufficiently perfected those inborn
faculties by training as well»74.
Man is not a passive creature, as the product of God’s workman-
ship, he is designed to exercise all the faculties given to him by the Creator.
The decrees that God has promulgated do not violate the free will of man,
but rather, help him to exercise it accordingly. In a word, God has so
willed it that man should act according to the very nature proportioned to
him. Locke puts it clearly in the Fourth Essay:
Partly also we can infer the principle and a definite rule of our duty
from man’s own constitution and the faculties with which he is equipped.
For since man is neither made without design nor endowed to no purpose
with these faculties which both can and must be employed, his function ap-
pears to be that which nature has prepared him to perform. That is to say,
when he in himself finds sense-experience and reason, he feels himself dis-
posed and ready to contemplate God’s works and that wisdom and power
of His which they display75.
Apparently, Locke starts to introduce in this paragraph his most
salient epistemological doctrine, that is, his reference to the sense-experi-
ence and reason as the basis of all knowledge. Here, he insinuates the im-
portance of sensitive and rational faculties of man in the process of know-
ing. Man is the only creature that God has endowed with reason, and by that
rational character He made him distinct from the rest of His creatures. God
wills that through reason man can also attain the knowledge of divine reali-
ties. Thanks to that special faculty of the mind, man comes to know the law
of nature; man has, in a way, a sure access to the eternal law of God.
Evidently, if God makes the primary matters intelligible, and
through them men arrive at the notion of the Deity; and if the faculties en-
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dowed in them are such that by their very nature are capable of knowing
the natural law, what else can be doubted if in its origin and by its very na-
ture it is cognoscible? Locke never doubted the faculties of men, on the
contrary, he exalted man above all other creatures for his rationality. Simi-
larly, he bestowed high respect upon God’s work of creation and attributed
to it an indispensable role in the process of intellection.
However, deep inside he was so realistic and susceptible to all the
things that were really happening around him. It was his sensitivity that led
him to inquire into the cause of men’s indifference towards the law of na-
ture and of their growing ignorance of it, or in the worst case, the denial of
the law of nature. History has confirmed this devastating abandonment of
the basic principles of the natural law.
Objections and replies to its denial and ignorance. In the Second
Essay Locke introduces his observations on the awful social and political
condition with respect to the natural law, and I note them down here for a
better understanding of the natural law. The three main objections can be
summarized as follow: (a) why are there many people blind to the natural
law?; (b) how come many mortals have no knowledge of it?; and finally,
(c) why do nearly all think of it differently? These questions seem to imply
the rejection of the universal and immutable characters of the natural law,
as well as the distrust in the capacity of the sensitive and rational faculties
of men. However, Locke convincingly refuted them by showing that the
fault was due to man’s negligence and improper use of his faculties. Here
follow his respective replies.
(1) Granted that our mental faculties can lead us to the knowledge
of this law, nevertheless it does not follow from this that all men necessari-
ly make proper use of these faculties... (2) Careful reflection, thought, and
attention by the mind is needed in order that by argument and reasoning
one may find a way from perceptible and obvious things into their hidden
nature. (3) Few are directed by reason, since men only seldom delve into
themselves in order to search out from thence the condition, manner, and
purpose of their life, then it is not to be wondered at that of the law of na-
ture, which is much less easy to know, men’s opinion are different76.
Locke, then, declares his conviction on the indispensable role and
importance of the senses and the mind, as he says, «there is nothing so ob-
scure, so concealed, so removed from any meaning that the mind, capable
of everything, could not apprehend it by reflection and reasoning, if it is
supported by these faculties»77.
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Promulgation of the natural law and the will of God. Before closing
this section, I would like to inquire into how to arrive at the knowledge of
the natural law by means of the light of nature. Locke suggests two prereq-
uisites in order to arrive at the knowledge of this law, that is, that there
must be a lawmaker and that there must be a will from his part. In the
Fourth Essay he states plainly that,
Certain facts must first be set forth, because they are necessarily
presupposed in the knowledge of any and every law. First, in order that
anyone may understand that he is bound by a law, he must know before-
hand that there is a lawmaker, i.e. some superior power to which he is
rightly subject. Secondly, it is also necessary to know that there is some
will on the part of that superior power with respect to the things to be done
by us, that is to say, that the lawmaker, whoever he may prove to be, wish-
es that we do this but leave off that, and demands of us that the conduct of
our life should be in accordance with his will78.
Locke highlights the subjection of man to the will of God and in-
sists that because of man’s condition as the workmanship of God, he has to
live in accordance with the law of nature. God has planned it in such a way
that man, with all the endowed faculties he received from Him, can arrive
at the knowledge of the natural law and be responsible for all his actions.
This idea appears similar to a voluntarist point of view. It is no
wonder then, that some voluntarist commentators may use this argument
as a basis of their position. However, I have to warn beforehand that much
later in the same work, and also in his mature major works, Locke was in-
clined to exalt the role of the senses and reason. On the other hand, it is
also good to note that this statement is in consonance with his divine no-
tion of the natural law, that is, the decree of the divine will. Locke under-
lines here the essential and indispensable role of God as the superior power
who, at the same time, has an inevitable command over all men. I insist
that though the divine will is an important prerequisite for knowing the
natural law, it does not discard, however, the most splendid and proven as-
sertion that the natural law can be known by sense-experience and reason,
that is, by the light of nature.
1.4. THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF NATURAL LAW
In this present consideration I will tackle the extent and weight of
the obligation of men to the natural law, which Locke discusses entirely
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and specifically in the Sixth and Seventh Essays. This is one of the impor-
tant aspects of the natural law, without which the validity of the law will
result to naught and men will not heed it any longer. To disregard the bind-
ing force of any law means to deny the authority of the lawmaker; it’s just
like playing a fool with empty words and non-sense principles. That is the
reason for its promulgation, so that men may follow its codes and bring
them into completion through the practice of the virtues it entails. No one,
with the right use of reason, can doubt its binding force, unless out of pride
and selfishness he wilfully escapes from it and hardens his heart in order
not to be subjected to any superior will.
Locke did not doubt the obligatory nature of the natural law; in
fact, he greatly recommended its faithful observance and raised it up so
that it would become an inalienable support of the rights of men. Such is
its superior force that he was compelled to declare that those who were
given the capacity to use their reason couldn’t refuse to obey, nor excuse
themselves from being obedient to its demands. The observance of this
law is almost concomitant to human existence, in such a way that no one
can excuse himself from the responsibility it brings. The expectation for
men is therefore exceedingly high, and God for His part, the author of this
law, would be so pleased to see men living in accordance with His com-
mands.
The problem in question. In the Essays, Locke takes into account
the two important characteristics of natural law, that is, its universal and
perpetual nature. He therefore dedicates a long inquiry into whether the
natural law is morally binding on all mankind at all times and in all places.
The extent in time and space and the scope of the obligation are the major
subject matters to tackle here. Is the law of nature dependent on or is it
limited by time? More concretely, will there be a time that man ceases to
be bound by this law of nature? Is it reasonable to say that the law is bind-
ing here but not in another place? If that is so, is it possible that the natural
law be binding only and exclusively for a certain group of people, but per-
mits the laxity of others? Locke introduced similar questions in order to
begin his inquiry, so that ultimately, he would be able to reaffirm the true
character of the natural law.
If all the answers to these questions were affirmative, then the law
of nature would be mutable, limited, contingent, and particular, and these
would absolutely contradict the divine and eternal origin of the natural
law. Hence, Locke reiterates his firm proposition by saying, «we assert
that the obligation of the natural law is universal and perpetual»79. Here he
proposes various objections to the binding force of the natural law, in order
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to prove later their falsity, and then, to put forth his argument in favour of
the universality and perpetuity of its obligation.
In the following sections, I will present the general conception of
Locke on the nature and extent of the obligation to the natural law. There
are four sub-topics that I wish to examine with respect to its binding force,
namely, the meaning of obligation; the classifications of obligation; the
common traits of obligation; and the basis of its binding force. Finally end,
I will add a short corollary regarding the cessation of the obligation.
1.4.1. The meaning of obligation
Locke approaches the problem by clarifying the meaning of the
terms employed in the proposition, which in this case, the word «obliga-
tion» takes priority. In the Sixth Essay Locke discusses in depth the bind-
ing force of the natural law and its implications in morality, as well as in
the daily life of man. What is an obligation? In this regard, Locke appeals
to the wisdom of the jurists and acknowledges their definition, which says:
«it is the bond of law whereby one is bound to render what is due», and by
law they mean, «the civil code»80. Then a little farther he explains the
meaning of the bond of law, by saying,
Hence, by the bond of law we must mean here the bond of natural
law whereby one is bound to discharge a natural obligation, that is, to fulfil
the duty which it lies upon one to perform by reason of one’s nature, or else
submit to the penalty due to a perpetrated crime81.
It appears quite evident that the binding force of the natural law is
constituted in the very nature of man –ex naturae suae ratione– because
that phrase débitum persolvere seems to indicate that man ought to do
something by himself, out of his own capacity and liberality. For that rea-
son he calls it a «natural obligation», insisting on the idea that the perfor-
mance of certain actions, the observance of the law is proportional to the
very nature of man. He also indicates here literally that man is bound by
the natural law, meaning to say, he is bound neither by any human institu-
tion nor by mere customs and traditions. Locke’s idea of proportionality
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regarding the extent and the force of man’s obligation towards the natural
law, von Leyden observes, is the influence of Dr. Sanderson and Curvel-
wel.
Locke makes another clarification about this bond, that is, with
respect to the origin itself of that binding force. It is plain that the obser-
vance of the law is in accordance with the very nature of man, but Locke
wants to know precisely from whence this bond takes effect in man. He
looks for another prerequisite that will prove the law to be really binding
for man, and proposes a question as to whether anybody can oblige man
or bind him to perform certain actions. His answer is clear: only he who
has a right and power over man can impose upon him an obligation.
Locke refers to that origin or source of obligation as the dominion and
command of a superior to whom man owes a duty –débitum persolvere
naturalem.
We must understand that no one can oblige or bind us to do any-
thing, unless he has right and power over us; and indeed, when he com-
mands what he wishes should be done and what should not be done, he
only makes use of his right82.
In the subsequent exposition on the classes of obligation, Locke at-
tributes this source of obligation ultimately to God who has a sole and ab-
solute right and power over his creatures. This is an assertion that is not
strange anymore even to his major works. Here then, he distinguishes the
two ways in which man discharges his débitum.
First, a liability to pay dutiful obedience [débitum officii]. He un-
derlines in this class of debt or duty the «conformity of one’s actions to the
rule imposed upon them, that is, the will of a superior power». Locke af-
firms that the source of this obligation is «partly from the wisdom of the
legislator and partly from the right of the Creator over His creation»83.
Since everything that man possesses, including his own being, comes from
God, it is out of duty that he has to give an account to God, and to Him
alone he has to submit his obedience.
Second, a liability to punishment [débitum supplicii]. If the ground
of obligation in the debitum officii lies in the wisdom and right of the Cre-
ator, in the debitum supplicii it lies in the authority and dominion of the
Lawmaker. The failure of man to dutifully obey the will of the superior
power is what makes him liable to punishment. It is a consequence of his
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disobedience to the law. Though there is a fear of penalty, still Locke
maintains that the obligation of man is brought by his recognition of the
authority of the Lawgiver and by right reason84.
The power and dominion over another admits different forms in the
name of «right», such as God’s natural right and the right of creation by
which all things owe Him their existence and preservation, or the right of
donation of parents and monarchs who received from God a share of His
dominion over the creatures, or the right of contract, in the case of the vol-
untary submission of oneself to another’s will. However, Locke has a dif-
ferent conception when it comes to a duty towards pirates and allegiance to
the king. Respectively, man’s obligation towards pirates is grounded on
the reason of his own safety, and his allegiance to the king is based on a ra-
tional apprehension of what is right.
In both cases, Locke maintains a sort of a voluntarist view of the
moral obligation of man, which means that the binding force of the law ulti-
mately leads back to the authorship of God, whether it be an observance of
a duty to obey, or a recognition of God’s dominion and power to castigate
disobedient creatures. Other authors infer that it cannot be other than the
will of a superior power since the imposition of an obligation is an act85.
1.4.2. The other classifications of an obligation
Further, Locke proposes other distinctions that are meant to clarify
the binding force of the natural law. These are the twofold classes of
obligation, namely, (i) that some things bind effectively [obligare effec-
tive] and others only terminatively [obligare terminative]; (ii) that some
things bind by themselves and by their intrinsic force [per se et vi sua]
and others indirectly and by a power external to themselves [per aliud et
virtute aliena].
(i) Things that bind effectively or only terminatively
That thing binds «effectively» which is the prime cause of all
obligation, and from which springs the formal cause of obligation, and
from which springs the formal cause of obligation, namely, the will of a su-
perior. For we are bound to something for the very reason that he, under
whose rule we are, wills it. That thing binds «terminatively», or by delimi-
tation, which prescribes the manner and measure of an obligation and of
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our duty and is nothing other than the declaration of that will, and this dec-
laration by another name we call law86.
Then, Locke makes it clear that man is bound only to what the Law-
maker has promulgated to men87.
(ii) Things that bind of itself and by its intrinsic force or indirectly
and by external power. Only the divine will is binding upon men by its in-
trinsic force; and this divine will is either known by the light of nature and
is called natural law, or by revelation and is called positive law.  «Indirect-
ly and by delegated power the will of any superior is binding, be it the king
or a parent, to whom we are subject by the will of God»88. Locke stresses
here that the origin of the power to impose the law by any lawmaker or any
human superior derives directly from God. Man submits himself to the do-
minion of the  king or his parents because God wills it and delegates to
them His power.
Finally, Locke gives three arguments to prove that the natural law is
binding upon all men primarily and of itself and by its intrinsic force. In all
these arguments Locke underlines and reaffirms the sole importance of the
will of God as the basis of man’s obligation to the natural law and His in-
escapable right to men. At the same time, he declares the priority, the im-
portance, and the indispensability of the natural law over any human posi-
tive law; the impossibility of denying its existence; and the limited extent
of man’s obligation towards the magistrate and the civil law.
To sum up, the natural law is binding upon all men primarily and of
itself and by its intrinsic force,
(i) because it contains all the necessary requirements to make a law
binding, that is, the authority to impose the law, which belongs exclusively
to God, and the sufficient means to know it, that is, by the light of nature. It
is out of justice that man subjects himself to the will of God;
(ii) because the natural law has the same degree of binding force as
the divine positive law, since they only differ in their manner of promulga-
tion and means of cognoscibility;
(iii) because all other civil laws derive their binding force from the
natural law, and without the knowledge of revelation, the rights and au-
thority of the civil magistrate can only come from the natural law.
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1.4.3. The common traits of the obligation
If the natural law in its very nature is universal and eternal, it fol-
lows that the obligation to this law must possess the same characteristics.
The two main qualities that he underlines in the Seventh Essay are the uni-
versality and perpetuity of its binding force. Locke explains this in the
same pattern as he did in the other essays, that is, by presenting some ob-
jections, replies, and propositions.
Objections. The first observation that he lays down here is the exis-
tence of different customs and traditions in many places, from which
doubts are raised as to whether the natural law is binding on all mankind,
thus, its universal and perpetual character is put into question. There are
those who object that the natural law is not always binding on all men be-
cause there exist various customs, decrees and codes to follow that make
difficult the discernment of the law itself. He uncovers the core of this ob-
jection in the fact that
[Men are] unsettled and uncertain, accustomed to the most diverse
institutions, and driven by impulses in quite opposite directions; for that the
decrees of nature are so obscure that they are hidden from whole nations89.
Perpetuity of the obligation. The obscurity of those decrees, due to
evident differences, makes people believe that no such law is perpetually
binding, or that the law is not completely known. However, Locke is not
convinced by the argument, so he negates this assumption right away as
something hard to believe. It is quite acceptable to say that some men are
born defective of the mind or the eyesight, but not that the whole nations
were blind to or absolutely ignorant of the law. At the end, the objection
leads to only one assertion, that is, that the binding force of the natural law
is neither perpetual nor universal. What does he mean therefore when he
says that the binding force of the natural law on all men is perpetual? What
does its perpetuity imply? Here he mentions two salient points regarding
the extent of its binding force.
Replies. In the first place, he proposes the parallelism between the
law and man’s existence, meaning to say, that the binding force of the law
permanently exists regardless of time and circumstances. The law of na-
ture always binds man, so he states,
The binding force of the natural law is permanent, that is to say,
there is no time when it would be lawful for a man to act against the pre-
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cepts of this law…. The bonds of this law are perpetual and coeval with the
human race, beginning with it and perishing with it at the same time90.
This is a strong argument. As long as man lives he is bound by the
law, only death can give a termination to this bond.
In the second place, Locke gives a precise clarification about the
existence and duration of the bond and the fulfilment or performance of
certain actions in conformity with the law. He admits that the binding force
of the natural law is perpetual, but since man cannot perform different ac-
tions at the same time in fulfilling his duties, his actions need not be neces-
sarily continuous. Once again, he declares,
The binding force of the law never changes, though often there is a
change in both the times and circumstances of actions, whereby our obedi-
ence is defined. We can sometimes stop acting according to the law, but act
against the law we cannot. In this life’s journey rest is sometimes allowed,
but straying at no time91.
These arguments acquire a great repercussion in Lockean moral prin-
ciples, in the sense that the theory of natural law takes its priority in his entire
ethical program. The natural law sews all the basic elements of morality and
radiates its integrating influence in his political theory and religion.
Moral propositions. Concerning the binding force of the natural
law, Locke uncovers his principles with more precision and profundity. He
makes four concrete assertions.
(First), there are things which are altogether forbidden and to these
we are bound… for ever; in other words, there is no single moment when
one is at liberty to perform anything of this kind without incurring guilt; for
example theft, murder, and other acts of that sort.
(Second), there are other things towards which the law of nature
requires us to maintain certain sentiments, such as reverence and fear of
Deity, tender affection for parents… To these, too, we are obliged forever.
(Third), there are things of which the outward performance is com-
manded, for example the outward worship of the Deity, the consoling of
the distressed neighbour… in these matters we are not under obligation
continuously, but only at a particular time and in a particular manner.
(Fourth), there are cases where the action in itself is not command-
ed but only circumstances accompanying it. For example, no one is bound
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to talk about his neighbour, but when he chooses to do so, natural law bids
him talk candidly and unscathingly (von Leyden’s paraphrase). In cases
like these, the matter of the action is neither good nor bad, but the circum-
stances accompanying it are so determined. We are not bound here ab-
solutely, but only conditionally, and it depends on our ability, and is en-
trusted to our prudence, whether or not we care to undertake some such
actions in which we incur obligation92.
Locke concludes that in all these arguments it remains clear that
«the binding force of the law is equally permanent, the requirements of our
duty, however, are not equally permanent… so that while the action comes
to an end at some time, the obligation never does»93.
Universality of its obligation. Now, with regard to the universal
character of the obligation, it is convenient to clarify first the significance
of the terminology that Locke uses here. Common people may understand
it in a way that nobody is exempted from following the precepts of natural
law, all men without discrimination are compelled to obey all laws at all
times. It may be seen simply as the obligation that applies to all men of all
ages, conditions, and of all circumstances. Locke’s first assertion is that
the universality of the natural law does not depend simply on the fact that
«any and every law of nature is binding on all and every man, since this is
impossible. For most precepts of this law have regard to various relations
between men and are founded on these»94.
Locke mentions that at the time of performing this obligation, the
binding force accepts certain differences. He introduces here the idea of
equality and proportionality; the proportionality has something to do with
the various relations among men, and the equality refers to the nature of cer-
tain precepts. Locke explains these differences in the following statements.
Those precepts of the law of nature which are absolute and which
embrace thefts, debaucheries, and slanders, and on the other hand religion,
charity, fidelity and the rest … are binding on all men in the world equally,
kings as well as subjects, … Those decrees of nature which are concerned
with the various conditions of men and the relations between them are bind-
ing on all men exactly in proportion as either private or public functions de-
mand; the duty of a king is one thing, the duty of a subject is another95.
Despite the different degrees of obligation, Locke maintains that,
«the binding force of natural law is everywhere the same, only the circum-
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stances of life are different»96. He is emphatic indeed when underlining its
perpetuity and universality so much so that he qualifies the natural law as
something untouchable and almost coequal if not above the human crea-
ture’s dignity. The binding force of the natural law therefore has never
changed and it will always be binding upon the whole world throughout
the ages. Locke manifests his disagreement with the argument that the nat-
ural law is not binding because it is either «not delightsome to some part or
the whole of mankind, or again that it has been repealed»97.
1.4.4. The basis of the obligation and its universality and perpetuity
Locke opens the Sixth Essay with an argument posed by those who
claim that the basis of its binding force is the self-preservation of man and
the principle of utility. This assertion supposes that the law is binding only
as long as man takes advantage of it and secures his safety and welfare
through its observance. For the utilitarians, the law is binding, good, and
practical if it is useful to man. This argument seems to attribute a natural
right to man, apparently an inalienable right that nobody can take away. In
this case, man becomes powerful and makes himself almost an author of
this law, such as what Hobbes calls the «rights of all against all». Locke re-
futes this argument and shows the reasons of its inadequacy in the true na-
ture of the natural law. Here is how he develops his rebut,
If the source and origin of this law is the care and preservation of
oneself, virtue would seem to be not so much man’s duty as his conve-
nience, nor will anything be good except what is useful to him; and the ob-
servance of this law would be not so much our duty and obligation, to which
we are bound by nature, as a privilege and an advantage, to which we are
led by expediency. And thus, whenever it pleases us to claim our right and
give way to our own inclinations, we can certainly disregard and transgress
this law without blame, though perhaps not without disadvantage»98.
The words in italics are important to note especially for their moral
implications, which later on will be of great help to better understand the
Lockean concept of morality. It is plain that Locke does not agree with
Hobbes in this matter, that is to say, in putting the basis of obligation in the
theory of self-preservation and utility. The observance of the law becomes
a privilege and an advantage, not anymore a duty that emerges from the
very nature of man and of the law.
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Locke was aware that this kind of attitude, the self-gratifying be-
haviour of man towards the law, could be a major cause of such offences
against God and humanity. In fact it was a major cause of such offences
and he himself could testify with his own experiences. Based on this be-
lief, man appropriates to himself certain rights, which indeed do not exist.
In a sense, man makes himself the measure of everything, and his actions
become the expressions of his whims and fancies.
Man’s rationality and the binding force of the law. The natural law
does not bind man neither for the reason of his self-preservation nor for his
personal utility. The basis of its binding force must be grounded on some-
thing firmly established in the very nature of man, and it must be propor-
tional to the great value of its qualities. In the following argument, Locke
states the basis of the perpetual and universal binding force of the natural
law.
[The natural law] is not a private or positive law created according
to circumstances and for an immediate convenience: rather it is a fixed and
permanent rule of morals, which reason itself pronounces, and which per-
sists, being a fact so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature. Hence hu-
man nature must needs be changed before this law can be either altered or
annulled. There is, in fact, a harmony between these two, and what is prop-
er for the rational nature, in so far as it is rational, must needs be proper for
ever, and the same reason will pronounce everywhere the same moral
rules99.
The perpetuity of the natural law is such that «human nature must
needs be changed before this law can be either altered or annulled». This
statement is boldly striking and so firm that Locke would surely stand de-
fending it with great conviction. Undoubtedly, he sees in the rational na-
ture of man as the sure ground of this eternal binding force of the natural
law. He employs the word harmony (convenientia, Latin) to indicate the
close connection between the law and the rational nature (convenientia sit
inter hanc legem et naturam rationalem).
The rationality of man is an important requisite in the consideration
of universal obligation, most particularly with regards to the equal obser-
vance of the absolute precepts. There is nothing to doubt in the universal
applicability to men of the binding force of the natural law, in so far as the
rational nature is effectively inborn. Thus he continuously declares,
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Since therefore all men are by nature rational, and since there is a
harmony between this law and the rational nature, and this harmony can be
known by the light of nature, it follows that all those who are endowed with
rational nature, i.e. all men in the world, are morally bound by this law100.
«All those who are endowed with rational nature are morally bound
by this law». It seems to indicate that the genesis of this obligation is co-
eval with man’s existence, and that no one is exempted. Indeed, he men-
tioned at the beginning of this argument that no one must feel free to be ex-
empted from this law, because natural law is not a private or positive law
created according to circumstances and for an immediate convenience. But
since man is equipped with reason and other sensitive faculties, «there nec-
essarily result from his inborn constitution some definite duties for him,
which cannot be other than they are»101. Locke takes this argument as his a
priori cause of obligation, that is to say, man’s innate constitution. It is
good to note also that this bond is extended only to the moral aspects of
man.
There is also a little detail implicit in this statement, that is, the pre-
sumption that there are some who have not received fully this rational fac-
ulty. It is probable that for them it would be more difficult to attain the
knowledge of the natural law for the deficiency of the light of nature. In
fact, when he talks about the case of children and idiots, Locke admits that
it does not, however, bind those to whom it is not given, and it is not given
to those who are unable to understand it102.
Motivations and the goal of man’s obligation. All laws, be they di-
vine or human, lead to one specific and ultimate goal: eternal happiness. In
that context, the assurance of Locke that all laws point in that direction is
his voluntarist conception that the sole standard of morality is the eternal
will of God. God has designed in his eternal plan that the laws He promul-
gated would enable men to reach their final goal in life. The role of the di-
vine Lawmaker is essential in the happiness of men. In the Fourth Essay,
he makes this argument more clearly where he states,
Hence, having inferred this on the evidence of the senses, reason
lays down that there must be some superior power to which we are rightly
subject, namely God who has a just and inevitable command over us and at
his pleasure can raise us up or throw us down, and make us by the same
commanding power happy or miserable103.
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And regarding the finality of God’s work of creation, Locke insinu-
ates the moral obligations of men towards the eternal will of God. He con-
tinues saying,
The maker of these things is not only powerful but also wise, hence
it follows from this that he has not created this world for nothing and with-
out purpose. For it is contrary to such great wisdom to work with no fixed
aim. Hence it is quite evident that God intends man to do something, and
this was the second of the two things required for the knowledge of any and
every law, namely, the will on the part of a superior power with respect to
the things to be done by us; that is, God wills that we do something. But
what it is that is to be done by us can be partly gathered from the end in
view for all things104.
God wills that we do something. This proposition indicates the
moral duties of each man towards the Creator, and Locke clarifies, at the
same time, that the «things to be done» by men derive from the will of the
superior power. So, the actions that men must do correspond to the just
commands of God, which, according to His wise governance, carry with
them the eternal rewards and punishments. Moreover, these rewards and
punishments do not result from the mere election of men, but rather from
the wisdom and goodness of God.
It is convenient to recall the arguments of Locke as quoted earlier
where he says that «He (God) has goodness and wisdom to direct our ac-
tions to that which is best: and he has power to enforce it by rewards and
punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can
take us out of his hands». Thus, from this proposition it can be inferred that
God, through his divine decrees, lays down the path of man’s eternal des-
tiny, be it happiness or misery.
There seems to be no problem in exalting the essential role of the
divine law, but when it comes to the consideration of human actions them-
selves, the hope of eternal reward and the fear of eternal punishment seem
to be insufficient motives for men to obey the divine decrees. Early com-
mentators have already seen this preoccupation of Locke about God being
a «benevolent despot, at worst a tyrant»105. One of the most distinctive po-
litical issues of the seventeenth to eighteenth century in England was the
«unlimited power» of the magistrate over the civil and ecclesiastical mat-
ters.
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If Locke had maintained solely an absolute theistic voluntarism, he
would be trapped in a labyrinthine. That is why he immediately finds an
exit by recurring to the idea of God’s unlimited goodness and wisdom
–«that his aim is to cause as much good or pleasure for his creatures as
possible»106. Men should find in the divine law a positive motivation that
can satisfy their obedience to God, because if their actions were done out
of fear or simply for motives of pure sanctions, it would be against their
will. Therefore, such actions cannot be called moral or voluntary actions.
Locke touches another important question here, that is, whether the
divine sanctions are really necessary in natural law. I have shown earlier
that Locke gives only three requisites for anything to be called a law. Liter-
ally, the divine sanctions do not abide by any of these conditions, and yet,
they form an integral part of Locke’s description of the natural law. The di-
vine sanctions, I would say, are the consequence of his concern for the
good of men and the wisdom and power of God.
To sum up, the natural law as a divine decree carries with it the cor-
responding eternal rewards and punishments. These are not mere additions
to the binding force of the natural law, but rather, an essential part of it.
The sanctions are intended not only to motivate men, but also to make
them realize their final good according to the wise plan of the Creator. Cer-
tainly, they manifest God’s goodness and wisdom. The consideration of
the divine rewards and punishments implies the supernatural and eternal
character of the natural law. It opens the transcendental end of man, as the
consequence of the conformity or disagreement of his actions with the law
of nature.
Corollary: cessation of the obligation to the natural law. There is
another assumption against the universal binding force of the natural law,
which Locke refers to the cessation of obligation to the natural law.
Again, he argues that the cessation of the binding force is against the very
nature of man and contrary to the will of the Creator. The will of God is
irrevocable, and His eternal plan for man is such that He would need to
create another species of human being in order to abrogate the natural
law. This is impossible and would contradict the very nature of God Him-
self as Creator. Thus, he rejects categorically the idea that the natural law
can be repealed; and since the natural law admits not even a single breath
of possible abrogation, it is inferred that this law cannot be but universal.
He says,
This natural law will never be abolished; for human beings cannot
alter this law, because they are subject to it, and it is not the business of
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subjects to abrogate laws at their liking, and because God certainly would
not wish to do so107.
Locke unceasingly declared the excellence of the natural law and
its priority over other human authority because of its undeniable divine
origin and because of its congruous relation with the rational nature of
man. In whatever case and whatever objections against the universal and
perpetual character of the binding force, Locke simply refutes them on the
grounds that the problem resides not in the law itself, or in the different
opinions and differences of customs and practices but in the inappropriate
use of men’s faculties and their inclination to their appetites108.
Therefore, with all the abovementioned arguments, it remains clear
that the natural law, which can be known by the natural light, binds all men
necessarily on the grounds of their rationality and the will of God. Because
of the harmony between the natural law and rational nature of man, the
obligatory character of that law is universal and perpetual. All these facts
are not only indisputable, but also demonstrable.
2. THE NOTION OF THE NATURAL LAW IN HIS LATER WORKS
Locke’s investigation of his chief concerns regarding moral theo-
ries ocupied more than half his life. Since his first conceptualisation of the
natural law theory in 1660 until the last, that is, the fourth edition of the Es-
say, we can observe that he was truly preoccupied with taking into account,
or at least with making some references to, his general ethical program in
several of his works. That is exactly my present concern here, that is, to
discover the most salient considerations that Locke made regarding the
natural law theory. 
2.1. SOME PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS IN HIS LATER LITERARY WORKS
2.1.1. An Essay concerning Human Understanding
In this work, Locke deals with the natural law more specifically in
his discussion on the ideas of moral relations. He explains that in the case of
moral relations it is not enough to consider them as simple moral terms, or
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determined ideas of mixed modes framed in our minds, because he believes
that these relations fairly determine our human actions as to whether they
are morally good or morally evil. Thus he defines moral relation as follows:
It is the conformity or disagreement men’s voluntary actions have
to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of109.
Our interest in this definition of moral relation is the rule to which
the voluntary actions of men are made to conform or disagree. The rule
concerns us because, when Locke gives the division or classification of
laws, he attempts to also establish his understanding of the nature of each
kind of law and its effects in the moral life of each individual person.
The most significant points. There are four concrete points that
Locke shows in his ideas of moral relations, namely, the role of the law-
maker; the hedonistic views of moral goodness and evil; sanctions as an
important constitutive element of every law; and the measure for judging
the moral rectitude of actions of man, that is, the conformity or disagree-
ment with any law.
(i) God is the author of the natural law. In the Essay, Locke main-
tains the idea that the true ground of morality is no other than God himself,
and that the existence of natural law is obviously made known to all
mankind. He says:
I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the obe-
dience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of
mankind give testimony to the law of nature: but yet I think it must be al-
lowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general
approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of moral-
ity; which can only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark,
has in his hand rewards and punishments and power enough to call to ac-
count the proudest offender110.
The abovementioned argument reflects the transcendental nature of
the law. And Locke assumes that all the existing precepts have this tran-
scendental aspect, thanks to their connection with the divine law. It clearly
shows that rewards and punishments are founded on the will of God, and
are coherent with His power and wisdom.
When he mentions in passing the objection of those who think that
the idea of God is innate, Locke states the requisite notion of the lawmaker
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for any kind of law. He says, «Without a notion of a law-maker, it is im-
possible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it»111. In
fact, it is in this argument that he admits the cognoscibility of the natural
law because the first principles of moral rectitude are deduced from those
already-formed universal ideas that reason itself has worked on.
Among the three sorts of law to which men generally refer their ac-
tions, Locke gives priority to divine law, from which the notion of the nat-
ural law is unmistakably implied. Here, Locke establishes the divine law
as a firm and inalienable foundation of morality, something that he main-
tains constantly not only in the Essay but also in several of his works. He
refers to that law of God, which is promulgated to men through the light of
nature. He states,
First, the divine law, whereby that law which God has set to the ac-
tions of men, –whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the
voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern
themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a right to
do it; we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our ac-
tions to that which is best: and he has power to enforce it by rewards and
punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can
take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral recti-
tude112.
Locke underlines in this statement the clear grounds or reasons for
God’s authorship, either in the divine positive law or in the natural law,
namely, the right of God as the Creator; His perfect goodness and wisdom
towards His creatures; and finally, His power to enforce it with sanctions.
Until this point, Locke maintained his thesis that only God has the authori-
ty in this matter since man lacks the perfection of God. The «exclusivity»
of the divine law as the true touchstone of moral rectitude signifies, on the
other hand, the rejection of other apparent standards of morality. It seems
to suggest that, for Locke, had there been other criteria of moral rectitude,
these would definitely fall under secondary classifications.
(ii) The hedonistic views of moral goodness and evil. Inherent in his
hypothesis of the moral principles is the concept of good and evil, which in
this case, Locke lays down the important participation of each individual
person. God has made man responsible for his destiny by acquiring for
himself the good or evil attached to his actions. Thus, in continuation,
Locke says,
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[and] by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the
most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether, as
duties or sins, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the
hands of the ALMIGHTY113.
This argument has a great repercussion in his idea of obligation to
the natural law, because it emphasizes the motives whereby man is moved
to perform his dutiful actions towards the Creator. But, what really makes
significant in this proposition is that these objectives of the law, either the
good or evil, involve a personal and hedonistic character. Although, it is
not as surprising as it might be because in the previous section Locke con-
ceived good and evil explicitly as pleasure and pain. He states,
Good and evil…. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which oc-
casions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is
only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law,
whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the law-
maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or
breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is that what we call re-
ward or punishment114.
(iii) The sanctions as a constitutive element of the law. Locke in-
sists that it is by God’s wisdom that sanctions are part of any law, and he
finds it absurd to decree a law without any sanction attached to it. Thus, he
boldly declares,
For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free
actions of men, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil
to determine his will, we must, whenever we suppose a law, suppose also
some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one
intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his
power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule,
by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of
the actions itself115.
If the law that God has given to men has an eternal and divine char-
acter, it is to suppose, without second thought, that the sanctions annexed
to this law must also possess a transcendental weight and effect. For that
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purpose, Locke maintains that the rewards and punishments have «infinite
weight and duration in another life». Thus, in the context of Locke’s natur-
al law theory, rewards and punishments take a very vital role. Darwall ob-
serves that sanctions are already part of Locke’s definition of the natural
law, and he also gives the reason why sanctions are necessary116.
(iv) The measure of moral rectitude. Locke clearly shows that the
foundation of moral relations lies in the conformity or disagreement of the
actions of men to any rule. This is the measure by which man judges his
actions as morally good or evil; and he reveals its differences according to
the kind of law. Thus, he states,
These three then, first, the law of God; secondly, the law of politic
societies; thirdly, the law of fashion, or private censure, are those to which
men variously compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of
these laws that they take their measures, when they would judge of their
moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad117.
Corollary. Locke acknowledged in his discussion of the law of
fashion, which in his second edition was called «philosophical law», that
the natural law is the rule of virtue and vice. It is his affirmation of the un-
alterable character of the natural law, which God has established as the
«unchangeable rule» of right and wrong. On this aspect, he declares,
There being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and ad-
vances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws
he has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as
the neglect of them. (Then a little later, he says) whereby, even in the cor-
ruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought
to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferred118.
A collection of simple ideas. This must be a crazy, confusing, and
curious argument that in the end, Locke considers the rule of moral actions
as only a collection of simple ideas. Indeed, more surprising still is his fi-
nal analysis that regardless of whatever kind of law or rule it is, everything
terminates in just a mere collection of simple ideas. He states,
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Whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or
the will of the law-maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation
any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees
with the rule… This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple
ideas, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple
ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires. And
thus we see how moral beings and notions are found on, and terminated in,
these simple ideas we have received from sensation and reflection119.
2.1.2. Of Ethics in General
In his later discourse on ethics, Locke maintains that the natural in-
clination of man to do good and to avoid evil, to seek happiness and to
shun misery are clear manifestations of man’s recognition of the law. That
man, not being aware of any established rules or norms of life, in his prim-
itive state can regulate and direct his life towards what he knows is the de-
sirable and highest good.
Locke reveals in this work his belief that morality is a science dis-
tinct from theology, religion, and law, because it belongs to the concern of
philosophers. And regarding his concept of morality, Locke says,
To establish morality, therefore, upon its proper basis, and such
foundations as may carry an obligation with them, we must first prove a
law, which always supposes a law-maker: one that has a superiority and
right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish according to the
tenor of the law established by him. This sovereign law-maker, who has set
rules and bounds to the actions of men, is God, their Maker120.
Locke maintains in his general idea of morality the hedonistic
views of moral good and evil; the idea of the moral relations; the cognosci-
bility of the law by the natural light; and its divine sanctions. Since it was
intended as chapter twenty-one of book four of the Essay, the continuity
and consistency of his thoughts on morality as a collection of several sim-
ple ideas are also remarkable.
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2.1.3. Two Treatises of Government
Existence and nature of the natural law. In the first place, we have
to understand that Locke employs here the concept of the natural law in a
different context, that is to say, in the extent of paternal authority, which
ties up similarly with the concept of government, the rights of all, freedom,
and the preservation of property. He admits that the natural law is in the
hearts of men121, and so, no one can ignore its existence. He also affirms
that it is «plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures»122.
With regards to the nature and origin of the natural law, there are
some opinions that Locke accepts both the voluntarist and rationalist
views. In that context, he underlines the important role of the will of God,
particularly concerning the idea of its superiority to all other laws. At the
same time, he is consistent in affirming that it is the law of reason, espe-
cially in his consideration of its promulgation. «Law is nothing else but the
Will of him that hath the Power of the Supream Father»123.
In his exposition of the extent of the Legislative power, Locke in-
sists on the importance of the natural law as a declaration of God’s will. He
says,
Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Leg-
islators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions,
must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the
Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and
the fundamental Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no hu-
man sanction can be good, or valid against it124.
Moreover, with respect to the right to property, Locke declares that
man’s right is grounded in the law of nature which is a command of God to
all men by virtue of his purpose of creation125.
Natural law and reason. One of the most significant ideas that he
poses here is the extent and limit of the obligation in accordance with the
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use of reason126. In his rebut of Mr. Filmer’s argument about the paternal
authority, Locke refers to the natural law as the law of reason: «For ‘tis
hard to understand how the Law of Nature, which is the Law of Reason,
can give the Paternal Power to the Father over his Children»127. Similarly,
in the Second Treatise, Locke identifies the law of nature with the law of
reason and makes it the basis of man’s obligation and his right to preserva-
tion. He says,
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which oblig-
es every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind who
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions128.
The law of reason has a great significance too in his concept of
freedom, for it gives meaning to it. He openly declares, «For all in the
states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no
Freedom»129. He declares that man’s rationality is the basis of man’s liber-
ty of acting, for that reason, man is born free. «We are born Free, as we are
born Rational»130.
Freedom and the limiting character of the natural law. Locke is a
great advocate of human freedom. He defends the liberty of men on the ba-
sis of the equality that God has proportioned to all men. He admits the
freedom of man both in the state of nature and in the society, and in conse-
quence, man is to be free from any earthly power; he cannot enslave him-
self to anyone. But Locke makes clear also the limiting character of the
natural law with respect to the exercise of man’s liberty. He admits that it
is the natural law that sets the limit of man’s rights both in the state of na-
ture and in the social state. He opens the chapter Of the State of Nature
with these words:
To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original,
we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of
perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions,
and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, with-
out asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man131.
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Then, to introduce his notion of slavery, Locke clarifies first the
true meaning and extent of man’s liberty. He says,
The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior Power
on earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man, but
to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule. The Liberty of Man, in Soci-
ety, is to be under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by con-
sent, in the Common-wealth, nor under the Dominion of any Will, or Re-
straint of any Law, but that the Legislative shall enact, according to the
Trust put in it. (…) As Freedom of Nature is to be under no other restraint
but the Law of Nature132.
The executive power of the law of nature. Locke puts the power to
execute the natural law primarily in the hands of every individual in the
state of nature, and he firmly maintains that no other power or authority
can deny this right to man. Moreover, this power of man to execute the law
of nature is even prior to any civil authority. Locke grounds this argument
on the basis of man’s right to preserve his property which is something
natural and sacred for every man. Locke maintains this idea almost
throughout the entire chapter on the State of Nature. I think section seven
is most emphatic where he finds the basis of man’s right to defend himself
and to apply sanctions to any transgressor of the law. I quote:
And that all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights,
and from doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed,
which willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of
the Law of Nature is in that State put into every Mans hands, whereby
every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a De-
gree, as may hinder its Violation. For the Law of Nature would, as all oth-
er Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain if there were nobody
that in the State of Nature had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby
preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the State of
Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do
so133.
It is so obvious that Locke is giving emphasis here to the right of
every individual; he makes man powerful, so to say, with respect to the de-
fense of the innocent and against any violator of the law. In the same manner,
his concept of the natural law condones the cause of men to rebel against a
tyrant king or any authority who abuses his power. The preservation of
one’s life is grounded in the natural law, from which it follows that man
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has also the right to kill the aggressor when he has no chance to appeal to
the law; likewise, an appeal to rebellion against all forms of tyranny is
rightful because this act is not against the persons but the authority. This is
what Locke calls an appeal to heaven134.
His principle of self-preservation is also extended to a right of man
to kill the one who initiates a war against him. This is a case that he pro-
posed regarding a thief who presumed to get any one into his power and
introduce him into the state of war. His principle of right gives him a justi-
fication to use force against a «presumed» aggressor. «It is Lawful for me
to treat him, as one who has put himself into a State of War with me, i.e.
kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever
introduces a State of War, and is aggressor in it»135.
2.1.4. The Reasonableness of Christianity
The divine origin of the natural law. In the Reasonableness of
Christianity, Locke refers the source of the law to the law of morality that
Jesus Christ has given to men. He says,
Such a law of morality Jesus Christ hath given us in the New Testa-
ment; but by the latter of these ways, by revelation. We have from him a
full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable to that of rea-
son… Here morality has a sure standard, that revelation vouches, and rea-
son cannot gainsay, nor question; but both together witness to come from
God, the great law-maker136.
Locke made it crystal clear that the rule of our conduct is to be
found in the New Testament. It was the argument that Tyrell and his Ox-
ford contemporaries were waiting from him five years back when he pub-
lished the Essay in 1690. Tyrell was so preoccupied and found nothing to
reply to those who accused Locke of Hobbism, so that in his long letter to
him on 27th July 1690, he demanded some clarifications on the question as
to whether the natural law is founded on Sacred Scripture as God’s re-
vealed will. Those accusers of Locke, whom Tyrell referred to as the
Christian interpreters of the natural law, were just eager to know if the di-
vine law that he mentions in the Essay is the same as the natural law137.
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Locke supports this argument with the idea of the insufficiency of
reason to be the sole standard of morality. He declares,
The human reason unassisted failed men in its great and proper
business of morality. It never from unquestionable principles, by clear de-
ductions, made out an entire body of the law of nature138.
Then, a little farther on he says that the obligation of men to this
«highest law» originates from the acknowledgement of God as the Law-
maker139. In that context, Locke refers the natural law to the highest law.
That statement strengthens further his idea of the primacy of the natural
law over other human laws and its closeness to the eternal law. It is good to
note here that the exclusivity of the divine law as the only true touchstone
of morality underlines the sole divine origin of all precepts that direct the
actions of men.
2.1.5. First Letter on Toleration
The divine law as the ultimate criterion of moral rectitude. In his
first Letter on Toleration, he exalts the belief in Deity as the ground of
morality and excludes it among the purely speculative opinions. He says:
I must only remark before I leave this head of speculative opinions
that the belief of a Deity is not to be reckoned amongst purely speculative
opinions, for it being the foundation of all morality, and that which influ-
ences the whole life and actions of men, without which a man is to be
counted no other than one of the most dangerous sorts of wild beasts, and
so incapable of all society.140
2.2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS IN HIS LATER WORKS
Evidently Locke considered many aspects of his ethical program in
the later works but his concern with the theory of the natural law points in
one concrete direction, that is to say, to the development of his major politi-
cal and social thought. All of these works reveal the maturity of his moral
doctrines and the consistency with his personal convictions and beliefs,
which I would say are definitely stable. I will underline some of those gen-
eral facets of his theory of natural law that he has left firmly established.
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2.2.1. On the foundation of morality
Locke maintains throughout his later works the indubitable founda-
tion of morality, which is no other than the divine law, promulgated either
through revelation or through the light of reason. The natural law definite-
ly finds its origin in the eternal will of God, unalterable and independent of
any human or civil authority. Indeed, this law remains the only valid
source of other human positive laws and the basis of fundamental rights of
men. He insists on the necessary function of the lawmaker for the exis-
tence and cognoscibility of any law, which in consequence, establishes the
standard of all moral rectitude.
2.2.2. On the obligation of the law
The natural law is generally binding, and Locke has no doubt of its
force and validity, provided that the rational nature of man is maintained.
The basis of obligation is grounded not only on the participation of the nat-
ural law in the eternal will of God but also on the rationality of man. He
has a particular concern in the Treatises regarding the submission of the
will of man to the civil authority, or to the body politic, which is shown by
his statement that the civil power is restricted by the bounds of the natural
law. In that sense, his concept of the liberty in acting is also regulated by
the bounds of the natural law. However, on the idea of moral relations,
both in the Essay and Of Ethics in General, the obligation of man is con-
sidered under the measure of conformity or disagreement with any of the
three sorts of law.
Nonetheless, it is of divine decree that all men must follow the stan-
dard rule of moral rectitude, either for the sake of self-preservation or the
attainment of the highest good, that is, happiness.
2.2.3. On the hedonistic views of morality
The Essay covers for the most part of hedonistic principles on
morality, and it is here that Locke sufficiently develops the wide-ranging
extent of his concept of moral goodness and evil, both in its epistemologi-
cal and purely ethical grounds. He does not specify in the Treatises this he-
donistic view, but I would say that it is implicitly discussed in his theory of
the self-preservation, indicating the general objective of man’s inalienable
rights to secure his property, which in the mind of Locke is referred to
man’s life, possessions and liberty. The natural law procures this end for
man.
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2.2.4. On the executive power of the natural law
This is one of the most remarkable ideas of Locke concerning the
rights, or power of man that come from the law of nature. He consistently
affirms that in the state of nature, every man has the natural right, or power
to execute the law of nature, provided that its execution is grounded on the
defense of his life, or the innocent and on protection against tyranny. This
power has an individual and personal character that can be extended to all
those who are capable of laws, meaning to say, to those who are endowed
with rational faculties.
2.2.5. On the division of law
On the general concept of moral relations, the laws are divided into
divine law, civil law, and law of fashion or opinion; from which Locke has
not included explicitly the natural law. There is only a little insinuation of
it in the notion of the divine law concerning the means of its promulgation,
that is, through the light of nature; whereas in the Treatises, it is too evi-
dent. There are many allusions to the great role of the natural law in man
and in the political society, especially in the Second Treatise.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
The doctrines of Locke on the natural law seem inexhaustible and
they open still a variety of scientific approaches in Morality. These ap-
proaches can be of great interest not only to scholars of Locke’s philoso-
phy, but also to several natural law theorists of contemporary times. I
have focused my exposition on Locke’s theory of the natural law, which I
have referred generally to his earliest Essays and the other two major
works, namely, the Essay and the Two Treatises. I admit that my exposi-
tion has not exhausted the whole ethical program of Locke, but my at-
tempt would likely prove the importance and relevance of the natural law.
Indeed, I could have elaborated this or that particular element of his
thought but I believe and I am truly convinced that the matters I have pro-
pounded so far would be sufficient to bring out some important implica-
tions in morality.
From the publication of von Leyden’s edition of the Essays in 1954
to the present times, there have been a considerable number of studies and
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interpretations of Locke’s concept of the natural law. And surprisingly,
there is growing interest in it. However, it is a challenge to surpass the ex-
cellence of Locke on this matter. At the threshold of its fifty prodigious
years, Locke’s teachings in the Essays have continued to shed light on the
apparently obscure side of his major works. Many contemporary Lockean
scholars, in fact, have benefited from it.
Moreover, the theory of the natural law gave rise to other points of
discussion especially on matters of Morality and Politics. Has Locke’s
concept of natural law acquired additional development since the first pub-
lication of the Essays? Or, has it raised another problem and interest by
stirring the intellectual quietude of modern times? If Locke had laid down
far and wide in the Essays everything he needed to explain to Tyrell and
his contemporaries, there would be no more left to say. In whatever case,
there is still a growing amazement and intellectual gusto for the study of
Locke’s concept of the natural law. In fact, some scholars have initiated a
society and foundation to immortalize the idealism of John Locke141. Con-
cretely, on the concept of the natural law, there are no more new ideas
added in Locke’s corpus philosophicus, but there have been several inter-
pretations proposed by modern Lockean scholars. In the following sec-
tions, I will give my critical analysis of his own concept of the natural law,
with due respect to some modern interpretations of the subject matter. The
new approaches to his natural law theory gave rise to several points of in-
terest, which I will also try to elaborate.
1. THE DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF THE NATURAL LAW
There is one very notable aspect of Locke’s understanding of natu-
ral law which, after a short retrospect to his antecedents and contempo-
raries, I can affirm that he had profoundly delved into the core of the sub-
ject matter. His knowledge of the natural law is awe-inspiring. The Essays
manifest his interest and rich knowledge of the natural law, in the sense
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that he was able to connect its classical notions with the modern concep-
tions. I recognize his expertise and great ability to determine with convic-
tion and clarity every aspect of the natural law. It shows that he devoted so
much time and effort to reading and pondering it. A closer look at the seve-
ral illustrations he used in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Essays will lead
us to the ancient Greco-roman times and will bring us to as far as the Asian
and Southern American civilizations142.
With respect to the eternal and immutable character of the law of
nature and to its divine origin, I may qualify Locke as a scholastic Christ-
ian bearer of the natural law theory in the midst of Humanism and rapid
scientific progress. I ground this consideration on his firm conviction that
the natural law is the decree of the divine will and participates in the eter-
nal law of God. His acknowledgement of the divine Lawmaker as the only
promulgator, who has the right and full authority over it, leads him to a
solid theological conception of the natural law. Acknowledging the natural
law as part of the divine plan with inherent rewards and punishments,
Locke must have resorted to the Aristotelian teleology that every nature
tends to its end. The natural law has a divine origin and it aims towards the
acquisition of an eternally designed end, that is, perfect happiness. Such
was his adherence to the theological feature of the law that some modern
Lockean scholars have regarded him as an advocate of medieval volun-
tarism. The inseparability of Morality and Theology in the plain scholastic
view is palpable in Locke’s belief in the divine origin of the natural law.
However, the more he insisted on the theological conception of the
natural law, the more emphasis he put on its rational character. For exam-
ple, he identifies the law of nature as the law of reason, unwritten and to be
found only in the minds of men since it is made known by reason alone
(ELN, I and TTG II, 136). His main point is plainly underlined here, that
is, the importance of man’s rationality in the cognoscibility of the natural
law. I do not ignore this rational aspect in the classical concept of the nat-
ural law, because the idea of the natural law as the law of reason was so
prevalent in Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Hooker.
I wish to emphasize here the way Locke refuted those errors regard-
ing the avenues of knowledge of the natural law, namely, by inscription, by
tradition, and by the general consent. He resorted to the principle of «sense-
perception and reason», that is, the commonly known lumen naturae, in or-
der to establish the rationality of the knowledge of the natural law. Can we
infer, then, that his insistence on the sense-experience and reason was an in-
sinuation already is this a theory regarding empirical mothers?
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Thanks to the influences of Sydenham, Boyle, Thomas, and the
other great French scientists, he learned the experimental and corpuscular
approach to the reality of things. But since the Essays were already writ-
ten long before he met those great physicians and scientists, it cannot be
argued that the rationality thesis in the Essays was a result of his collabo-
ration with them. Rather, his empirical theory is posterior to the Essays,
though not absolutely distinct with his «individualistic» approach to the
cognoscibility of the natural law. Nevertheless, presuming that his empiri-
cism was already latent in the Essays, then his encounter with those
prominent thinkers was just another way of consolidating his vocation to
empiricism. Whether it was latent there or not, I would suppose that the
seed of empiricism had taken root then in his mind. At any rate, the em-
pirical consideration of the law is fully perceived in his discussion of
moral relations. In the Essay, Locke firmly established that the moral rule
and all moral notions are just simple ideas we receive from sensation and
reflection143.
If the voluntarist and intellectualist elements of the natural law
were evidently present in his Essays, what other distinguishing marks of
the natural law can we draw out this work that modern scholars have like-
wise observed? Undoubtedly, it was his adaptation of the anthropological
and social concerns with regards to the binding force of the natural law. It
is evident that in Locke’s time, great thinkers like Grotius, Hobbes,
Pufendorf, and Culverwel were concerned with the extent of man’s subjec-
tion to the authority, the idea of freedom, toleration, the social norms, and
the proper use of rights in the self-preservation principles. All these trends
are akin to the concept of the natural law and are truly remarkable in Locke’s
anthropocentrism. His natural law theory is in its consideration on the con-
cept of the human person. For that reason, Locke emphatically insists that
the natural law «is so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature. Hence hu-
man nature must needs be changed before this law can be either altered or
annulled»144.
On this aspect, Locke developed a deeper understanding of the
obligatory character of the natural law. He asserted that no one could be
exempted from its binding force, especially those who are endowed with
the use of reason. But much later, clarifying his position, Locke would
negate its binding force upon idiots, children, and the demented (ELN III).
Therefore, it is plain that there exists a harmony between the natural law
and the rational nature of man.
In the fourth argument on the existence of the natural law, Locke
made use of the human society as an evident proof that the law of nature is
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indispensable to any human institution. Although his main objective in this
part is to show the important role of the natural law, it is also implicit that
Locke could not ignore the social sense of the law. It is within the society
that the natural law can have its full and real expression; it is in human re-
lationships where its binding force can take effect, such as the obedience
of the people to the magistrate, or of children to their parents. In the Two
Treatises, Locke asserts that the fundamental law of nature is the preserva-
tion of mankind145. It is so clear in his later conviction that the law of na-
ture exists for the good of all men, for their protection and security, and the
preservation of property.
In summary, it can be inferred that his concept of the natural law is
theological, rational (and inherently empirical), anthropological, and so-
cially oriented. Locke established a significant value of moral principles in
his consideration of the binding force of the natural law. His concern for
the fundamental basis of the natural law has created a wide-ranging field
of intellectual work, which brought positive appraisal of the natural law
theory.
2. THE TENETS OF THE NATURAL LAW ARE DEMONSTRABLE.
Another innovative aspect of Locke’s theory of natural law is its
demonstrability, which Hancey observes as a kind of deviation from the
traditional conception of the law. He grounds his analysis on the following
text of Locke in the Essay, and I quote,
Morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics: since
the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfect-
ly known, and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be
certainly discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge146.
Locke established the cognoscibility of the natural law on the basis
of demonstrable means, that is to say, on the things knowable to man’s ra-
tional faculties. This is his most constructive statement on this matter: the
precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly
known. Hancey observes that, «The search for a demonstrable law of na-
ture reflects Locke’s great (and perhaps, undue) faith in the ability of men
to come to grips with their world»147.
Geraint Parry accepts also the demonstrability of the natural law
and atributes it to man’s rationality, however, he emphatically ascribes it
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to the important contribution brought by the experiences of man. Individ-
ual experimentation can provide a better rational explicability of this law,
and in such case, Parry maintains a clear empirical basis of the natural law.
He insists that, for Locke, the «knowledge of the law of nature –the
universal laws of morality– is based on reasoning from experience of the
world»148. This inference gives rise to his theory of individuation, wherein
he admits the accessibility to the knowledge of the natural law through the
experience of each individual. In the next section I will deal with it in more
detail. Hence, the possibility of demonstrable ethics emerges from the in-
terplay of the intelligibility of God’s works of creation, that is, the fact that
man can perceive them in his daily experiences, and the rationality of man.
In my exposition on the cognoscibility of the natural law, I made an
allusion to its demonstrability when I showed the important role of the
light of nature. The joint exercise of sensation and reason paves the way to
the knowledge of the natural law. His idea of the lumen naturae is the cue
to this demonstrable knowledge. Similarly, his insistent negation of the
Cartesian innate ideas puts him closer to his empirical principles, and con-
sequently, to demonstrable ethics. With his views on the three possible
avenues of knowledge, Locke showed clearly the big difference between
the knowledge acquired through experiences, that is, by means of sense
perception and reason, and the knowledge supposedly inscribed in the soul
of man, or merely handed down by men through successive generations.
His main point is that, in the other two avenues of knowledge, namely by
inscription and from tradition, there is no assurance of the validity of truth
and no stability on the basis of the authority. Likewise, they are incapable
of demonstrating the knowledge of truth about the natural law, and can be
accepted only as proof of beliefs.
The acceptance of innate ideas devalues the power of reason and ig-
nores the process of intellection, as Locke observes, «the moral proposi-
tions are known to us without any study or deliberate consideration»
(ELN, III). For Locke, no knowledge results or is derived from merely ir-
rational means such as the knowledge from tradition. Simple belief or popu-
lar approval cannot demonstrate the knowledge of the natural law since the
sole basis of its demonstrability is the rational nature of man.
It is plain, therefore, that the demonstrability of the natural law
supposes all the means proper to the nature of intellective faculties of
man, and for that reason, Locke rejects «belief and opinion» and general
consent as the basis of the natural law. Locke’s proposition shows the in-
adequacy of belief and general consent to prove and demonstrate the exis-
tence and knowledge of the natural law. For him, man’s «knowledge de-
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pends on the evidence of facts» (ELN, II). In any demonstrable science, a
rational character is requisite, either in its object or in its means, without
which, it cannot be regarded as a true knowledge. In that context, Locke
does not qualify as natural law that which is derived from tradition, but
rather, he calls it a «derived law» (ELN, II). Among the modern Lockean
scholars, no one denies his innovative approach to the demonstrability of
the natural law.
3. INDIVIDUALISM
In the introduction to his work, John Locke (1978), Parry observes
that in the context of toleration and the magistrate’s authority over reli-
gion, Locke’s «intellectual anti-authoritarianism» was already apparent in
the early Essays. He assumes that,
By 1667 Locke may already have felt that the way to the knowl-
edge of the law of nature and to salvation required individual experiment
and that the dangers of religious experimentation were not so great as he
had once feared149.
Parry approves this argument without a second thought, taking into
account Locke’s change of attitude on toleration after having observed in
1665 the peaceful and orderly living, in spite of the different beliefs, of the
people of Cleves. Locke’s experience there must have induced him to have a
more tolerant attitude concerning one’s right to act and worship according
to his personal beliefs in God. Locke believes that these rights are derived
from the natural law. From this contention Parry imputes the individual
concern of Locke towards religion. He states,
The law of nature entails that one respect other persons as equally
creatures of God, and desist from injuring them by unfairly denying their
right to express their own sense of individuality to the degree of which they
are capable150.
There are two salient points that Parry underlines in his theory of
individuality, first, that man can obtain the knowledge of the natural law
through his individual experience; and second, that salvation is a matter of
individual concern. No one has the power either to impose the way in at-
taining it, such as a creed to profess or a religion to follow, or to deny the
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right of practicing one. Every individual has an equal right to express his
belief, and that right springs from the law of nature. Much later, Parry af-
firms that, «the foundation of Locke’s theory of individuality lay in a view
of man as a being with rights and duties in a divine order of creation»151.
Likewise, in his study of Locke’s approach to the cognoscibility of
knowledge, Hancey shows himself in favour of the principles of individu-
alism. Adhering to Locke’s idea that tradition cannot be the source of
knowledge, he admits that, «the correct ordering of sense-perceptions and
rational deliberation about their import are matters for the individual»152.
He assumed this individualistic tendency of Locke on the basis of his early
Puritan formation with its emphasis on the individual’s vocation.
On the other hand, von Leyden reveals the contrary position of
Locke by the year 1660-1, when he refuted Bagshaw’s claim of an indivi-
dual’s right regarding indifferent things in matters of religion. Locke af-
firms that for public security and peace, the civil magistrate has the power
to intervene in religious matters, and declares that this power is derived
from the natural law. Thus, in his First Tract on Government, Locke de-
clares, on the basis of a social compact
That supposing man naturally owner of an entire liberty, and so
much master of himself as to owe no subjection to any other but God
alone… it is yet the unalterable condition of society and government that
every particular man must unavoidably part with his original right to liber-
ty and entrust the magistrate with as full a power over all his actions as he
himself hath153.
Before these two opposing interpretations, I have to warn that the
incongruity should not be seen in the context of the work itself but rather
in the different historical contexts and objectives wherein the matter was
being considered. Moreover, I suppose that the opposing statements of
Locke can be applied solely to his consideration of the submission of an
individual’s right regarding the indifferent things of religion. But, in the
context of the cognoscibility of the natural law, Locke maintains his posi-
tion on the principle of individuality. Parry regards it as one of Locke’s
major contributions to the theory of the natural law.
I believe that Locke did not intend to come out with a theory of in-
dividuality from his study of the natural law, although it is also undeniable
that he was fully aware of its implications. In fact, he mentioned it in some
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scattered texts of his major works. The idea of individuality arose as a con-
sequence of his rejection of general consent and tradition as avenues to the
knowledge of natural law. Yet, I suggest that it is in man’s rationality
where a strong foundation of the theory of individuality resides. This is ev-
ident in the context of the cognoscibility of the natural law because, as I have
cited before, Locke insists on the possibility of arriving at the knowledge
of truth «by (man) himself without the help of another, if he makes use of
the faculties he is endowed with by nature» (ELN, II).
The abovementioned argument is a clear declaration of each indi-
vidual’s power; it highlights the rationality of man and his independency
in obtaining the truth. Man is auto-sufficient with respect to lumen natu-
rae, and such sufficiency is drawn from the rational character that God has
given to man. This sufficiency is applicable solely and basically on the level
of knowledge, that is to say, in the acquisition of the knowledge of the na-
tural law. It is not my interest now to deal with the individualistic feature
of one’s salvation; I would leave it for a separate study154.
4. THEISTIC ABSOLUTISM VERSUS MORAL RELATIVISM
One of the important points that Locke also emphasized was his
consideration of man’s happiness and misery as a consequence of his obe-
dience or disobedience to the moral rules. In the Essays, he insists on the
important role of the divine Legislator as the reason for man’s happiness or
misery. God has included in his eternal design of the natural law, the divine
rewards and punishments. In that sense, the hedonistic feature of the law
seems to hold a more theological aspect. Man’s destiny is totally depen-
dent on the will of God. However, in his later works, particularly in the Es-
say, his hedonistic principles show a uniquely personal character. He as-
serts that, «Good and evil… are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which
occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us»155. From these different per-
spectives, there arise two conflicting theories, namely, theistic absolutism
and moral relativism.
This contradiction is not surprising, and from the time of Locke to
the present, many scholars have observed this inconsistency. Many of
them have also proposed several solutions to the problem. Before going
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further to those proposed solutions, I would first like to clarify the argu-
ments that might have brought him to either of these approaches: theistic
absolutism or the moral relativism.
On theistic absolutism, I think there are enough citations that I have
included in the third chapter of this work, particularly on the fundamental
source of the natural law and its obligatory nature. I would recall only
some of his most salient and significant arguments. For example, on the
subjection of man to the divine will, Locke states,
Reason lays down that there must be some superior power to which
we are rightly subject, namely God who has a just and inevitable command
over us and at His pleasure can raise us up or throw us down, and make us
by the same commanding power happy or miserable156.
It seems evident that Locke underlines here the dependence of
man’s actions and destiny on the power and wisdom of God. It is the will
of God that makes man happy or miserable. Locke has referred to divine
causality in order to prove the insufficiency of man to be a cause of him-
self; man lacks all the perfections that God has. For that simple reason,
man has to rely on the wise and just power of God to enable him to per-
form virtuous acts and to shun vicious ones. So, man’s destiny is totally
dependent on the will of God. As I have shown earlier, Locke owes this
voluntarist view to his scholastic background. He acknowledges too that
the only source of natural law, and morality in general, is God, as the di-
vine Lawmaker. He maintains this argument in the Reasonableness of
Christianity, when he refers to the law promulgated by Jesus Christ in the
New Testament the true foundation of morality.
In the same way and with the same force, Locke asserts that the
obligation of man to the natural law is drawn ultimately from the will of
God. Thus, when he discusses the kinds of obligation, especially about the
law that obliges man effective et terminative, he makes it clear that, 
We are indeed bound by Almighty God because He wills, but the
declaration of His will delimits the obligation and the ground of our obedi-
ence; for we are not bound to anything except what a lawmaker in some
way has made known and proclaimed as his will157.
Curiously, in the Essay he also makes this assertion immediately af-
ter his argument on the apparently relativist view of morality. There, he
declares that the divine law is the «only true touchtone of moral rectitude»
(Essay II.28.8). So far, I have shown here his arguments on theistic abso-
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lutism on two grounds, that is, the fundamental source of the natural law
and its obligatory nature. This is undeniably a clear manifestation of Lock-
e’s voluntarist view and his obvious acceptance of medieval theistic
Ethics. Let us take a look now on the relativist perspective of his morality.
First of all, I would like to make a little clarification on his concept
of hedonism in the Essay. The consideration of pleasure and pain comes
out as a consequence of Locke’s concern for the origin of moral ideas. Un-
der the general heading of the Moral Relations, Locke draws the moral
ideas of good and evil, and asserts that, «Moral good and evil, then, is only
the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law,
whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the law-
maker»158. His primary object here seems to be the «relation» between the
actions of man and some kind of law, in order to establish finally the origin
of the moral ideas of good and evil.
At the bottom of this argument, I would assume that Locke did not
intend to discuss here the natural law as such. In fact he did not mention
the word «natural law» in the Essay, instead, he included it under the clas-
sification of the divine law, or sometimes under the law of opinion. The
idea of the law comes in as the parallel post of man’s actions and it is there
that the agreement or disagreement enters. Hence, the attribution of the he-
donistic principles to the natural law is a result of the general consideration
of the moral relations as simple ideas.
What do we mean by moral relativism? When we say that morality
is relative, we mean that there is no absolute basis of goodness and evil;
that our actions can be good or bad depending on the different circum-
stances, or on our purely subjective knowledge of moral norms. It means
that moral goodness and evil depend on the convictions of each individ-
ual. The moral obligation does not mean simply a subjection of man to the
superior power, but rather a personal recognition of his capacity to attain
the end of his actions. In the case of the natural law theory, it also implies
that the natural law would no longer be immutable and universal, for its
moral truth would depend and conform to the convenience of each indi-
vidual.
By moral relativism, we also mean that the rectitude and the validity
of moral acts are measured not simply by their conformity or disagreement
with the laws, but rather by the personal disposition of the subject. Locke’s
moral relativism is wrapped in his hedonistic principles, wherein good and
evil are considered as pleasure and pain. In this context, Locke asserts that,
Good or evil…. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which oc-
casions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is
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only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law,
whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the law-
maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or
breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and
punishment159.
Likewise, in the Ethics in General, Locke admits this relativistic
view of good and evil as follows,
For good and bad, being relative terms, do not denote anything in
the nature of the thing, but only the relation it bears to another in its aptness
and tendency to produce in it pleasure or pain; and thus we see and say, that
which is good for one man is bad for another160.
The former quotation points to our conceptual knowledge of moral
good and evil, which I believe, attends to Locke’s assertion of its relation-
al character. What we can expect from this proposition is primarily an
epistemic consideration of morality. Hence, in this context, the epistemic
concept of moral good and evil is grounded, as Locke asserts, «on the con-
formity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law». Then, he
insists that it does not affect the nature of the thing, for the simple reason
that they are mere «relative terms». Nevertheless, it is good to note his at-
tribution of pleasure and pain to our knowledge of good and evil. In that
sense, the latter quotation coincides with the former one.
Some commentators observe that Locke’s moral relativism is
grounded on his denial of the existence of an intrinsic property of good-
ness and evil. In the absence of an intrinsic good and evil, Locke offers re-
lational properties of good and evil under the forms of pleasure and pain.
When he says that «good or evil is that which occasions or procures plea-
sure or pain to us», he is advocating already an implicit subjective morali-
ty. Moreover, his assertion that «which is good for one man is bad for an-
other» strengthens further his idea of moral relativism. Supposing that this
were Locke’s main tenet of the moral goodness and evil of our actions,
then, it would contradict his earlier assertion that the only true touchtone of
moral rectitude is the will of God, that is, that moral goodness and evil are
founded on the objective divine will.
The inconsistency is obvious and inevitable. If the entire ethical
program of Locke had validated both sides, there should exist an exit from
these confusing arguments. Since Locke did not provide us with clarifica-
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tion of these aspects of morality, the interpretations also vary from one au-
thor to the other. Some scholars have tried to find a solution to this incon-
gruity, and I will try to present some different attempts of interpretation on
this matter, like that of Polin, Colman, and Zinaich.
On the nature of good and evil, Polin addresses the problem by ana-
lyzing the origin of our moral concepts, from which he deduces the essen-
tial role of the pleasure and pain. He is aware of the incongruity in the
foundational criterion of moral rectitude and validity, but he has not found
great difficulty in reconciling the role of the will of God and the empirical
approach of Locke to the origin of the moral concepts. The point to which
he gives greater emphasis is his idea of pleasure and pain as the «visible
criteria of good and evil», which, in this case, fall under the designed order
of God’s will. It is under the context of sanctions of law that Locke situates
the pleasure and pain161. I observe that Polin’s interpretation is an attempt
to put together the theistic absolutism and the moral relativism under the
wide-ranging hedonistic principles of Locke.
In the first place, Polin admits Locke’s idea that good and evil are
moral relations, and as moral relations, consequently, they are derivations
of complex ideas. In the mind of Locke, these ideas ultimately originate
from the two main sources: one is natural, and another is institutional. The
natural source refers to the natural law promulgated by God, and the insti-
tutional is the product of man’s rational processing that begins from his ex-
periences. In the end, Polin proposes a reciprocal collaboration between
the will of God and the rational faculties of man162. In this aspect, he does
not only avoid the conflicting question of absolutism and relativism, but
also provides a safe way out.
Like Polin, Colman recognizes the two conflicting aspects of Lock-
e’s morality, that is, his ethical rationalism, so prevalent in his earlier Es-
says, and the moral relativism which appears in the context of his hedonis-
tic principles in the Essay. Colman tries to resolve some of the objections
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latent in these two aspects of Locke’s morality. His main aim is to show
that there is no inconsistency in the moral theory of Locke.
Against those who claim that Locke’s philosophy is contrary to the
natural law theory, Colman affirms that, «Locke does not find the content
of morality in the arbitrary will of God. The view of him as theological
voluntarist is due to a failure to distinguish between his account of moral
obligation and his moral epistemology»163. Colman is convinced that these
are two separate topics in Locke’s morality. On one side, actions are con-
sidered right or wrong with respect to the law promulgated by God and
binding on all men. On the other side, the moral concepts of good or evil
are drawn from the interests and needs of every individual. However, with
regards to the latter, Colman clarifies that Locke does not propose here a
utilitarian theory, but rather maintains his natural law principles.
On the objection that Locke upholds a cultural moral relativism,
that is to say, that right and wrong are determined by the variable law of
opinion, Colman suggests that Locke does not deny the first cultural moral
formation of man, but he insists that the true touchstone of moral rectitude
is the unvarying divine law standing behind the law of opinion164. Still oth-
ers object that Locke departs from the classical natural law tradition, but
again, Colman refutes them by saying that, «He certainly could not be con-
sidered a natural law theorist if he maintained that the content of morality
was alien to human nature and imposed by God upon man, but quite clear-
ly he does not hold this view»165.
Colman confronts an even harder problem to resolve, that is, the in-
congruity between the absolute and objective validity of the divine law as
the only source of moral rectitude in the Essays, and the subjectivist and
relativist notions of good and evil entailed in Locke’s hedonistic principles
in the Essay. His hedonistic principles lead inevitably to a kind of individ-
ualism with respect to the relative causes of pleasure and pain. Likewise,
since the source of pleasure has to be decided by each individual, there ex-
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ist different ways of attaining human happiness, and there can also be var-
ied objects of good. In the end, it simply implies that «there is no absolute
and universal content to human happiness. Even the joy of heaven cannot
be considered man’s summum bonum in the sense that it perfects human
nature»166. Locke resolves this problem by resorting to the eternal reward
as the only true happiness and final end of man, because it is only the eter-
nal reward in the next life that can procure a «pleasure without any admix-
ture of pain».
To show the consistency of Locke’s doctrine on the existence and
content of the natural law with the hedonistic principles, Colman infers
that «even Locke’s subjectivist and relativist account of good and evil
may be seen as arising out of an endeavour to defend the traditional natur-
al law ethic»167. I restate that in this argument, Colman sees no difficulty
in reconciling them because it is merely a problem of proper distinction
between Locke’s account of moral obligation and moral epistemology. I
observe that Polin and Colman have one thing in common, that is, their
focus on hedonism as a link to the two opposing poles of absolutism and
relativism.
In his recent study on the inconsistency of Locke’s moral theory,
Zinaich has found the proposals of Colman (and Laslett) insufficient and
unsatisfactory, so he suggests a new solution to this problem. He takes as
his point of departure the corpuscularism of Boyle as one of the most pos-
sible ways of exit to this knotty Lockean morality. But, he also admits
some advantages and disadvantages of this proposition. On the positive
side, he believes that by internalizing Boyle’s corpuscularism, Locke at-
tempts to reject theism altogether and maintain instead a relativistic con-
ception of moral goodness and evil. While on the negative side, Zinaich
observes that it does not square with the committed Christian life of Locke
nor with the text of the Essay. Moreover, this proposal disapproves the ex-
perimental attempt of Locke at the new science168.
Zinaich believes that, for Locke, moral relativism is an extension of
Boyle’s corpuscularism; and that he tries to establish a moral standard
based on the implications of the new science. In this way, Zinaich resolves
to liberate Locke from the opposing forces of the theistic absolutism and
moral relativism. Then, he states the many advantages of this view.
First, it squares well with his rejection of the existence of moral
properties and his argument for the relativity of moral goodness and evil. It
also works well with his placement of the Divine Rule on the equal footing




with the other rules. The interpretation also fits well with his personal
views on Christianity and his attempt to adjust the text to avoid trouble. Fi-
nally, this last view draws together his views of virtue and vice and the ex-
perimental flavour of the Essay169.
I have no doubt about the interests and the objectives of those three
authors I have cited above. They have their respective arguments that,
though they do not coincide with one another, they both recognize the two
distinct moral propositions of Locke. I agree that the theistic absolutism, or
the ethical rationalism in the Essays, and the moral relativism in the Essay
are inevitable, or I may say, almost necessary. I think, Laslett has a more
convincing argument with respect to what we have been intending to clari-
fy: both the earlier voluntarist conceptions of Locke of the natural law and
the later relativist view of morality are irreconcilable –despite the fact that
Zinaich disapproves it.
Zinaich grounds his disagreement with Laslett only on the basis of
Locke’s inability to find a solution, but upon going further on the same
text, he does not give attention to the proposition that he shares Laslett,
that is, the different starting-points or the different contexts in which
Locke began both works170. What I am trying to show in this argument is
that both aspects of Locke’s morality cannot be considered only or restric-
tively from its textual content, but also, from the different historical con-
texts in which Locke wrote these important works. Evidently, whatever at-
tempts we make, or whatever solutions we propose, no doubt these will be
valid and acceptable. However, once the historical context and the intellec-
tual program of the author are neglected or disregarded, all the solutions
will remain relative and purely suppositions.
For that reason, Colman is right in saying that these are two sepa-
rate topics of Locke’s morality, and therefore, no inconsistency should be
posited. Laslett has reason to say that the Essay, which is intended to es-
tablish the origin and extent of our moral knowledge based on empirical
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data is irreconcilable with the Two Treatises because the moral principles
that Locke infers there are basically developed in view of the social and
political contexts and needs. Similarly, Zinaich’s proposition of Locke’s
internalization of Boyle’s corpuscularism that bridges the gap with the tra-
ditional philosophy is worthy of note.
I admit that this might be a shallow (or ridiculous) solution for a
deeply philosophical problem, but that is the reality, and we cannot pro-
ceed in our analysis without considering this aspect. I propose that each
particular work of Locke on morality be considered separately in order
not to confuse the intrinsic doctrines prevailing on each work. I presume
that when Locke was writing the part of the Essay on moral relations, his
entire attention was focused on his epistemological program. Similarly,
when he was discussing the natural law in the Two Treatises, his mind
was totally concentrated on its social and political implications. If such
were the case, then from an all encompassing perspective of Lockean
morality, the possibility of incongruity could be highly expected which in
fact, many scholars have clearly noted it. This, in fact, is the observation
of many scholars.
If Locke had only followed a single ethical program, he would
have created a consistent moral theory on both epistemic and political levels.
But, as he himself said to Tyrell, while he was reediting some parts of the
Essay, he left the topic of general ethics for some opportune time, his ethi-
cal concern was not put into total oblivion, but was temporarily suspended
until the opportune time, which in fact, had not materialized.
5. LOCKEAN NATURAL LAW THEORY:
YESTERDAY AND TODAY
My final task is to present Lockean natural law theory in the current
moral and political situations of the world. I dare to challenge my great
philosopher and put his moral principles before the most varied contempo-
rary trends. There are two fields where I wish to find the relevance of his
natural law theory, that is, in Ethics and in Politics.
In the field of Ethics. Nowadays, the awful reality is that many peo-
ple seem to ignore the fundamental law of nature, the reason of which can
be traced primarily to either the lack of, or a defective formation of reason
and will, or the obstinate mind and heart of man himself. Without faulting
anyone, a horrible parade of immoralities continues to creep into the life of
people and passionately devours the innermost thoughts of the old and the
young, alike. Thus, the faces of wiles become so tangible and active that
the boundaries of the truth are dimmed; the most basic principle of morali-
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ty, that is, doing good and avoiding evil, appears to stand at the edge of the
precipice. One of the chief causes of all these evident ploys of evil is none
other than the abandonment of the law of nature.
The most affected creature of this moral avalanche is the human
person, whose value and dignity are oftentimes considered as mere instru-
ments for technical and scientific advancement. Recently some ground-
breaking research was successful but only following failed attempts that
squandered many human lives. I have in my mind the recent achievement
of Korean specialists who have perhaps effected the first human cloning
through the use of the stem cell embryos. It was said that of the 242 ova,
only one was successfully a stem cell embryo171.
In the name of honour, prestige, and towering world record, artists,
athletes, and world fashion protagonists are sometimes subject to unrea-
sonable and inhuman trainings and sustenance. In the disguise of culture
and art, young people are informed (as opposed to formed) to believe that
certain cultural and artistic activities are morally sound and deeply rooted
traditions that are meant to survive as part of the social identity172. There
are more unnamed varieties of evil in the world today that seem to re-
transmit the words of Locke:
Nay, by this time every kind of evil has grown up among men and
spread over the world and become mixed with everything. In the past men
have already shown so much ingenuity in the corruption of morals and
such a variety of vices that nothing has been left for posterity to invent or to
add, and it is impossible for anyone to commit any crime whatsoever of
which there has not been an example already173.
There is an indubitable truth in the words of Locke that can be ap-
plied to the current moral degradation in the society today. When people
take general consent or the utility principle as the basis of the natural law,
no doubt, several kinds of evil would likely emerge. So, the main reason
for social malady is not that man ignores or has no knowledge of the natural
law, but rather that he mistakes it for the principles that are mere human in-
ventions.
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However, paradoxically, despite the global corruption of morals,
everyone claims to be a great advocate and defender of human rights. Peo-
ple are becoming more and more aware of this inalienable right, though in
many occasions it is understood as the correct realization and expression
of freedom. There is an impressive resurgence of a clamour for rights, both
from the part of each individual person and from the institutional commu-
nity. Moreover, this concern is extended not only to human beings, but
also to the entire work of creation. It is remarkable that some groups claim
to defend the rights of animals. Regarding the preservation of the environ-
ment, there are also movements that struggle for the basic human right to
live in a healthy and satisfactory environment174.
We have also heard of some strong and influential bands of soci-
ety who promote newly conceptualised forms of relationships or unions,
and try to pursue their goals in the name of individual human rights175.
There was a case of a lesbians in Spain to whom the adoption of twin
girls conceived through artificial insemination by one of them, was
granted by the judicial court. The result was that lawfully the twin girls
have two mothers but have no father. This is another claim for the right
of homosexuals to form a family. We live in a «world of Rights» and
there seems to be no way to ignore it. It appears that in the whole context
of morality, men think and act with a profound ignorance, of absolute
truth. People want to establish an ideal autonomous moral life. Are they
aware that the rights they strive to claim should be founded on the natu-
ral law?
It is true that Locke acknowledged the perfect freedom of men over
any human authority? However he also declared that all rights of man must
be grounded in the law of nature. Therefore, the freedom and the rights of
man are measured and limited by the natural law. He says,
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174. The United Nations Organization declared the right of man to live in a
healthy and satisfactory environment during its Meeting of Experts on Human Rights
and Environment on January 14-15, 2002. In section 8 of the Conclusions, it says:
«the experts noted that in the last decade a substantial body of case law and decisions
has recognized the violation of a fundamental human right as the cause, or result, of
environmental degradation». Source: http://www.unhchr.ch/environment/index.html
(2002). Consulted on 20th April 2004.
175. In the headlines of 16th April 2004 of the Human Rights Campaign News,
appears this title: Thousands mobilize against federal marriage amendment upon
launch of human rights campaign meetup. It was a demonstration to oppose an anti-
gay amendment to the U.S. Constitution. «No one wants discrimination written into
our nation’s founding document and fair-minded Americans across the country are
speaking out», said HRC President Cheryl Jacques. «The early success of our Meetup
initiative demonstrates the groundswell of opposition to using the Constitution to
deny rights to any American». Source: http://www.hrc.org/ (2004). Consulted on 20th
April 2004. 
(The freedom of man is) a liberty to follow my own Will in all
things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to another in-
sconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man. As Free-
dom of Nature is to be under no other restraint but the Law of Nature176.
Therefore, human rights cannot be based merely on the human will
or communal agreement, suchs those which are known nowadays as «civil
rights», or, the «rights that resulted from the general sociological surveys».
Human rights cannot be just a simple general consensus of the people. No
one can claim a right merely because it is accepted by the majority as a
right. Moreover, these rights cannot be converted into laws and be promul-
gated simply through general consent. It is clear in the fourth argument of
Locke on the existence of the natural law that, «positive civil laws are not
binding by their own nature or force or in any other way than in virtue of
the law of nature», and continues, «without natural law the other basis also
of human society is overthrown»177. In this respect, Locke’s idea is posi-
tively acceptable. 
Locke and the new concept of just war. In the Two Treatises, Lock-
e’s concept of right is extended also to a certain kind of right to kill, provid-
ed that there is an imminent danger to life and an appeal to the court is made
impossible. This attitude is justified by his principle of self-preservation,
which as he inferred, is also grounded on the law of nature178. Man is the po-
tent executioner of the natural law in the state of nature. Can this principle
justify war against another state? I must admit that Locke has also justified
an appeal to heaven, that is, a resort to rebellion against a tyrant, when the
fundamental law of nature is constantly violated or abused.
There is a serious concern of the international community regarding
the continuous threat of terrorism, which is sought as a justification to de-
clare war against a presumed enemy. Nowadays, the definition of enemy is
extended not only to a «state-enemy» but also to a criminal organization,
which goes beyond the frontiers of any state179. The members of this crimi-
nal group are bound by a sole idealism of war against the infidels. The
threat is global and undetermined. The new concept of a military strategy
applied by the US is known as the «preventive attack» against a presumed
enemy, regardless of an imminent danger to the national security.
González explains that the most solid argument for a preventive attack is
the possession of arms of massive destruction that are in the hands of any
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to punish the aggressor.  
179. Ana Marta GONZÁLEZ, «El debate sobre Irak en EE.UU». in Aceprensa,
25/03. Edited by Ignacio Aréchaga (Madrid: Larvi, 2003), 2.
terrorist organization. The attack can be directed not only against a terror-
ist network, but also against the states that support them180.
The question as to whether a «preventive attack» is justifiable by
the law is a matter of open debate in the global political community. Ac-
cording to the National Council of Churches and the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the United States, the Iraq-war case cannot be justified be-
cause it has no moral legitimacy and it lacks the clear and adequate proofs
of Iraq’s implication in the September 11 attacks. Rev. Wilton D. Gregory,
the president of the Bishops Conference, admits that, «the preventive and
unilateral use of force is hard to justify in this occasion»181. Then, he ex-
plains his declaration based on the classical notion of a just war, which can
be qualified by four conditions: a) a just cause; b) a legitimate authority; c)
a probability of success; and, d) a proportionality and respect to non-com-
batants.
How would Locke conceive the idea of the preventive attack? In
the case of a thief or a presumed aggressor, Locke justified the killing of
another person with the reason of the irreparable loss of life. He declares,
It is Lawful for me to treat him, as one who has put himself into a
State of War with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he just-
ly expose himself, whoever introduces a State of War, and is aggressor in
it182.
Once again, Locke shows his adherence to the principle of indi-
vidualism, in the sense that every individual can perform his duty to pre-
serve his own life without the intervention of any authority. The natural
law determines the extent of his right over the life of another person. The
natural law makes man auto-sufficient to defend himself, and if possible,
to make use of force against his presumed aggressor. This sense of autono-
my is manifested in the unilateral use of force by the US military. The use
of force against a tyrant has been the defense-mechanism of Locke that is
supposedly employed by the new conservatives183 in the Bush administra-
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181. Ignacio ARÉCHAGA (ed.), «¿El ataque a Irak: guerra justa?» in Aceprensa,
13/03. (Madrid: Larvi, 2003), 2.
182. Treatises II, §18, 280.
183. The Project for the New American Century, or PNAC, was founded in 1997.
Among its supporters are Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. The
ABC News Internet Ventures shares the aims of PNAC. It reveals «the Plan» to re-
move Saddam from his power, a proposal that was also included in an open letter di-
rected by the group to President Clinton in 1998. In that letter, they wrote: «The only
acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or
threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willing-
tion. The recent analysis of Aréchaga in Aceprensa (21st May 2003) shows
the antecedents of the present political and military theorists of the US
government, that were ultimately linked with the thoughts of Leo
Strauss184. Strauss is a Jewish atheist thinker and a professor of political
philosophy in the University of Chicago from 1949 to 1968, who had a
deep admiration for Locke, particularly, for his natural law theory and po-
litical doctrines. It is too hasty to suppose that some PNAC theorists could
have certain knowledge of Lockean political theory, but at least, in their at-
titude towards an alleged danger to national security, we can see some
affinity of doctrines.
In the field of Politics. It seems that political society tends to again
hold utilitarian and hedonistic principles, wherein the goal to be pur-
sued lies merely in temporal and material achievement. The good that is
proposed is relative, because it can be useful now but not in the next gener-
ation. The happiness that is promised is true for this portion of the society
but not for the other. It will be truthfully impossible to attain a desirable
common good outside the context of the natural law. The political theo-
rists’ primary concern must be centered on the good of the human person
and the promotion of the basic law of nature. The negligence of this prime
principle will result in a rule by wealth and power that leads inevitably to a
kind of tyrant regime, the surest cause of disobedience, rebellion, and dis-
order in the society. In that case, politics would become the scraping
ground of thirsty robbers and selfish corrupters of fame and honour.
Before this danger of despotic rule, Locke established the main end
or measure of political power. He says,
It (the political power) can have no other end or measure….  but to
preserve the Members of that Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Posses-
sions; and so cannot be an Absolute, Arbitrary Power over their Lives and
Fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a Power to
make Laws, and annex such Penalties to them185.
There are two imperative declarations of Locke in the Second Trea-
tise that are worth quoting here: first, «where-ever Law ends, Tyranny be-
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means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power». Source:
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/nightline/DailyNews/pnac_030310.html (2004).
Last consulted on 23rd April 2004.
184. See Ignacio ARÉCHAGA (ed.), «Neoconservadores, los estrategas del nuevo
mundo “unipolar”», in Aceprensa, 72/03. (Madrid: Larvi, 2003). On the study of Leo
Strauss about Lockean theories, see Leo Strauss, «Locke’s Doctrine of Natural Law»,
in American Political Science Review, 52. Edited by Harvey C. Mansfield (Washing-
ton: American Political Science Association, 1958), 490-501.
185. Treatises II, §171, 382.
gins, if the Law be transgressed to another’s harm»186, and second,
«against the Laws there can be no Authority»187. These are two proposi-
tions that firmly maintain the precedence of the natural law over any other
civil rules that deviate from the basic principles of moral politics. The
Bishop of Tarragona, Rev. Lluis Martínez Sistach, affirms the priority of
natural ethical principles over any political legislatures or any norm that
results merely from sociological surveys and investigations. He insists that
politicians and lawyers have to make politics and formulate laws that do
not disregard or oppose these ethical principles188. Locke admits the politi-
cal power of government, but always and only under the limit of the natur-
al law; once it is abused, the people have the right to overthrow its
leader(s) by force, and to install a new one that can preserve the members
of the society.
Summary. There are emerging signs of the natural law theory of
Locke in the present moral and political situations of the world. His doc-
trines that had gained advocacy and wide acceptance already in his times
seem urgently relevant today, especially his utmost regard to the natural
law as the standard of moral rectitude, both in the fields of Ethics and Po-
litics. The rapid passage of time and the insatiable movement for change in
contemporary trends weaken the validity of the natural law. Locke may not
be popularly known and cited by recent political theorists, but his thoughts
continue to surface imperceptibly in different philosophical propositions.
Undoubtedly, his influence can bring either positive or negative conse-
quences. Some of Locke’s tenets are worthy transmitting in our days, but
some others are better put into oblivion.
CONCLUSIONS
Fifty years after the first publication of the Essays, the natural law
theory of Locke has gained enormous development and has extended its
implications to many fields of science. In his entire moral program, there
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188. «Se debe evitar una política que tenga como norma suprema los resultados
de las encuestas e investigaciones sociológicas. Hay unos principios morales obje-
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bien común de la sociedad. (…) Los politicos y los legisladores han de confeccionar
políticas y formular leyes que no prescinden ni se opongan a estos principios éticos».
Lluis Martínez Sistach, «Exigencias cristianas del quehacer político», in Palabra,
481-482. Edited by José Miguel Pero-Sanz Elorz (Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, S. A.,
2004), 32.
have been innovative views and approaches that recent Lockean scholars
have worked on, especially in clarifying some obscure and doubtful ele-
ments of his moral standpoints and in affirming some existing hypotheses
about his natural law theory.
The publication of the Essays evinced the false supposition that
Locke forgot the natural law theory found in the Essay. Many modern
scholars have presumed that the problem really was not that he abandoned
the natural law theory, but rather, that he found a great difficulty in esta-
blising a sure way to reconcile his earlier and later thought. My suspicion
is that he was wavering between the Essays and Ethics in General. If he
had included in the fourth edition of the Essay his later thoughts from
Ethics, he would have set aside or totally forgot the Essays; or on the con-
trary, if he had published the Essays as soon as Tyrell requested  he would
not have dedicated a separate chapter on the Ethics in General. Anyway,
towards the end of his life, he authorized Peter King to take charge of pub-
lishing what he would think were necessary and of great value. Conse-
quently, King included in his «Excerpts», Of Ethics in General and made
no mention of the Essay. Von Leyden broke the code of silence. He was
the arrow that Locke had been holding tightly and patiently in the bow
centuries ago. Voilà! What an enlightening discovery!
Locke maintained the most classical trait of the natural law, that is,
the theological aspect of its origin and content. For him, the law of nature
has always been a decree of the divine will. God is its sole author. He has
the right, power, and wisdom to promulgate it to men as the Creator of all
things. Since God is the supreme Legislator of all laws, the natural law
cannot be but a participation of the eternal law of God. In the same way,
since man cannot have all the perfections that God has, it is only logical
that God alone can make the laws binding for all men. No law is universal-
ly and perpetually binding except that which is promulgated by God, either
through revelation or by the natural light. It is a clear affirmation of the
scholastic indebtedness of Locke and his adherence to a theological volun-
tarist posture. And I can assume without a second thought that, in this res-
pect, there is an evident continuity with the medieval Christian notion of
the natural law in Locke.
However, aside from his coherence with the classical scholastic
view of the natural law, Locke introduced his most innovative argument
for its cognoscibility. The distinguishing rational character of the natural
law has led him to admit the intellectualist approach and points of view.
The rationality of man is imperative to understand the intelligibility of the
natural law, which means that by the sole light of nature, through the
sense-experience and reason, man can have knowledge of the natural law.
Rationality is also the basis of his claim for the demonstrability of moral
doctrines. In the Second Essay, he established that by the proper use of the
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rational faculties, man can attain by himself, and without the help of ano-
ther, the knowledge of the truth. On this aspect, Locke arrived at the con-
clusion that the law of nature is the law of reason. At this point, he started
to show his concern to the empirical means of knowledge that he would
bring to maturity in the Essay.
In the midst of socio-political turmoil in England, Locke’s theory of
the natural law served him to settle the moral conflicts on the extent and
limitation of the legislative power, and to define the individual rights of
men. Locke manifested his inclination to the humanist doctrines of the
modern times, especially in the anthropocentrism of his morality. Man has
to be the chief concern of any law. For that reason, Locke adhered to the
self-preservation principle as one of the fundamental bases of the natural
law. He says that no human sanction can be good or valid if it runs against
the fundamental law of nature, whose main objective is the preservation of
all mankind189.
Locke’s assertion of the modern humanist concept of the natural
law in the Second Treatise is apparently inconsist with his thoughts in the
earliest Essays. The principle of utility is considered from two different
perspectives: first, in the Essays, self interest cannot be the basis of the na-
tural law nor of man’s obligation, since that would violate the laws im-
mutability, universality, and perpetuity; second, in the Second Treatise,
Locke insists that the right of man to preserve himself is based on the fun-
damental law of nature. From my own point of view, the two considera-
tions do not result in inconsistency. While in the former, Locke deals with
the origin and character of the natural law; in the latter, he refers to the
grounds for man’s power to execute the natural law. It is likely believed
that Locke’s concern in his mature philosophical career could not have
been so much with the theoretical foundation of morality, but rather with
practical Ethics.
Evidently, Locke conceived the natural law in its most basic classi-
cal manner however he cannot be considered as a purely traditional natural
law theorist because he has also introduced an innovative aspect to the
notion of the natural law. This new approach brought many clear impli-
cations for the modern conception of morality, especially from the per-
spective of personal responsibility. Locke developed a certain personal and
individualistic approach to the standard of basic moral norms. His individ-
ualism takes its point of departure from the means of knowing the natural
law, then much later, his concern for each one’s salvation. Locke discussed
these new propositions in the Essay and they became the nucleus of his lat-
er moral program. His tenet on rewards and punishments is indispensable
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for the consideration of his theory of individualism because they form cons-
titutive elements of the natural law.
In the Essay, he came out with the idea of moral goodness and evil
as the conformity or disagreement of the voluntary actions of man to some
law. Another weak point of his morality has emerged from that considera-
tion, that is, the moral conception of good and evil as mere pleasure and
pain. Here, Locke made an obvious shift of moral objective and a mode of
approach to morality. Sense experience plays now a great role in moral
rectitude, in the respect that moral good is none other than that which pro-
cures happiness, and moral evil is that which occasions man pain. The em-
bryos of individualism and relativism that developed in his earlier thoughts
are made manifest in the Essay.
One of the most devastating theories in Lockean morality, or may I
say, almost an incurable wound that he left, was his theory of hedonism. In
his earlier thoughts, Locke conceived the misery or happiness of man un-
der the general idea of theological voluntarism, that is to say, «God who
has a just and inevitable command over us and at His pleasure can raise us
up or throw us down, and make us by the same commanding power happy
or miserable»190. In his later works, however, man’s happiness or misery is
dependent on the conformity or disagreement of man’s voluntary actions
to the law. Once more, I am inclined to presume that this proposition could
have been another difficulty that Locke encountered; and that could have
been one of the reasons too for the delay of the publication of the Essays.
So far, I have underlined three general observations on Locke’s
concept of the natural law that disclose the difficulty in reconciling his ear-
lier and later moral thoughts. The ‘yesterday and today’ in Locke’s own
understanding reveals some remarkable internal inconsistencies, that is, in
the voluntarist and intellectualist grounding of the natural law; in the prin-
ciples of utility; and, in the principles of hedonism.
It is convenient to emphasize here once again that the key point of
all those difficulties begins with Locke’s empirical theory, that is to say, in
his consideration of sense experience as the primary foundation of moral
rectitude. Locke could have resolved this if only he had given up his earli-
er thoughts on the natural law, and simply maintained his innovative idea
in the Essay. His tendency to theistic voluntarism was so strong that he
could not help but keep the lectures on natural law under his table. His
doctrine concerning the origin of ideas on an empirical basis, however,
caused him to admit necessarily, moral relativism. He was forced into a
position of conflict between the voluntarist and rationalist view of morali-
ty. The ultimate foundation of his moral theory wavered between either the
JOHN LOCKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 107
190. ELN IV, 155.
will of God alone or the rationality of man. Locke has left us this posture,
no doubt, the benefit of our investigation.
His hedonistic principles have produced a lasting resonance in
modern times which have opened the way, similarly, to the many errors of
relativism and individualism. I admit that Locke had in mind the eternal
happiness of man as the ultimate goal of his moral principles. And for that
reason, he could assert finally that among the pleasures of man, the eternal
reward of God is the only one that has no admixture of pain. However, his
moral principles were stained with the epistemic and empirical views he
posed in the Essay that would make it difficult to avoid discrepancy with
his previous work.
Locke remainas an underground theorist from which the bountiful
seeds of thought sprout. In our times, there are scattered Lockean princi-
ples that continue to sow astonishment and contradiction as well; some are
already rooted in the way of thinking and living, and some are just starting
to crawl. In the ethical and political fields, I have mentioned the most re-
cent influences of Locke’s doctrines, which have reached us directly from
the scholars of Lockean theory, or indirectly through some incarnated
teachings in Modern Philosophy.
To say that Locke’s doctrines on Ethics and Politics are obsolete is
less acceptable, because in the present situation of global peace and securi-
ty, and in the context of political and legislative power, his natural law theo-
ry can still be a relevant influence, for better or for worse. The natural law
remains the most fundamental criterion of moral and political life, which I
believe, if Locke had to live in our times, he would insist that before any
abusive and arbitrary power, the natural law would still be the fortified de-
fense of men. But, his theory is tantamount both to providing a solid
grounding for morality based on the natural law, and to implanting as well
a weak and confusing criterion of moral goodness and evil with and exclu-
sively empirical and individual basis.
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